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CVE-2026-78795

Severity:

HIGH RISK

(7.5)

Information Disclosure (CWE-200) in Netcore B11 Router

CVE-2026-78795

Deferred

Vulnerability type

Category:

Information Disclosure

CWE:

CWE-200

Impact:

Sensitive Information Disclosure

Severity:

HIGH RISK

(7.5)

CVSS version:

3.1

Catch this CVE while code is being written

Detect vulnerable code directly in pull requests, so CVEs are fixed before merge.

Summary

A high-severity information disclosure vulnerability in the Netcore B11 Enterprise-level full Gigabit 9-port shop wireless router may allow a remote attacker to obtain sensitive information. The risk arises when a vulnerable device exposes the affected network-facing functionality to an attacker who can reach it.

A high-severity information disclosure vulnerability in the Netcore B11 Enterprise-level full Gigabit 9-port shop wireless router may allow a remote attacker to obtain sensitive information. The risk arises when a vulnerable device exposes the affected network-facing functionality to an attacker who can reach it.

Affected context

The issue affects Netcore B11 Enterprise-level full Gigabit 9-port shop wireless routers running firmware versions at or before v1.3.241114.024540, where an externally reachable service or management interface discloses information beyond what the requester should receive. The specific exposed data and triggering interface are not identified in the available description, so exposure depends on device configuration, network placement, and access controls.

The issue affects Netcore B11 Enterprise-level full Gigabit 9-port shop wireless routers running firmware versions at or before v1.3.241114.024540, where an externally reachable service or management interface discloses information beyond what the requester should receive. The specific exposed data and triggering interface are not identified in the available description, so exposure depends on device configuration, network placement, and access controls.

Exploit preconditions

  • Attack surface: A network-accessible router service or management interface - Required access: Network reachability to the affected device; authentication

requirements are not established by the available information

  • Trigger point: A request handled by the vulnerable functionality - Why exploitation is possible: The device may return sensitive information

without sufficiently restricting disclosure to authorized or trusted

requesters

  • Attack surface: A network-accessible router service or management interface - Required access: Network reachability to the affected device; authentication

requirements are not established by the available information

  • Trigger point: A request handled by the vulnerable functionality - Why exploitation is possible: The device may return sensitive information

without sufficiently restricting disclosure to authorized or trusted

requesters

Why this happens

The underlying bug is an information exposure condition in which a network service returns sensitive data to an insufficiently authorized requester. This maps to CWE-200, Information Exposure, because information intended to remain restricted may be revealed through a remotely reachable router interface. The insecure pattern can include missing authorization checks, excessive response data, or inadequate filtering of diagnostic and configuration information.

The underlying bug is an information exposure condition in which a network service returns sensitive data to an insufficiently authorized requester. This maps to CWE-200, Information Exposure, because information intended to remain restricted may be revealed through a remotely reachable router interface. The insecure pattern can include missing authorization checks, excessive response data, or inadequate filtering of diagnostic and configuration information.

Potential impact

  • An attacker may obtain sensitive device or network information
  • Disclosed data could support follow-on attacks against the router or connected systems
  • Exposure may reveal configuration details, identifiers, or operational metadata
  • Organizations could experience privacy, confidentiality, or network-security impacts
  • An attacker may obtain sensitive device or network information
  • Disclosed data could support follow-on attacks against the router or connected systems
  • Exposure may reveal configuration details, identifiers, or operational metadata
  • Organizations could experience privacy, confidentiality, or network-security impacts

General mitigation guidance

Mitigation generally focuses on reducing unnecessary information exposure and strengthening authorization boundaries. Secure-by-default patterns include limiting management services to trusted administrative networks, requiring authentication and authorization before returning sensitive data, minimizing response contents, and applying consistent output filtering. Organizations can reduce input trust by validating request parameters and treating all remote requests as untrusted. Router administration services should operate with least privilege, and administrative interfaces should not be exposed directly to untrusted networks where that is not required.

Mitigation generally focuses on reducing unnecessary information exposure and strengthening authorization boundaries. Secure-by-default patterns include limiting management services to trusted administrative networks, requiring authentication and authorization before returning sensitive data, minimizing response contents, and applying consistent output filtering. Organizations can reduce input trust by validating request parameters and treating all remote requests as untrusted. Router administration services should operate with least privilege, and administrative interfaces should not be exposed directly to untrusted networks where that is not required.

How teams detect issues like this

Detection can include reviewing router services for responses that disclose configuration, identifiers, credentials, topology details, or diagnostic data without an established authorization decision. Static and firmware analysis may look for network handlers that return sensitive structures directly, missing access-control checks, and verbose error or debug paths. Code review should examine every remotely reachable endpoint and verify data minimization. Network monitoring and policy enforcement can flag unexpected access to management interfaces and anomalous responses. Automated security review tools may help identify excessive data exposure and authorization gaps.

Detection can include reviewing router services for responses that disclose configuration, identifiers, credentials, topology details, or diagnostic data without an established authorization decision. Static and firmware analysis may look for network handlers that return sensitive structures directly, missing access-control checks, and verbose error or debug paths. Code review should examine every remotely reachable endpoint and verify data minimization. Network monitoring and policy enforcement can flag unexpected access to management interfaces and anomalous responses. Automated security review tools may help identify excessive data exposure and authorization gaps.

Sources

SourceLink
b11.comb11.com
netcore.comnetcore.com
github.comgithub.com/PRISMI-Team/VulnDisclos/blob/main/Routers/Netcore/sensitive-information-disclosure.md

Frequently asked

questions

Yes, the description identifies a remote attacker as the threat actor. Exploitability still depends on network reachability to the affected router functionality.

The available information does not establish whether authentication is required. The relevant conditions are access to the vulnerable interface and any authorization checks enforced by the device.

Restrict the affected service to trusted networks, require strong authorization before returning sensitive data, and minimize all externally visible responses.

Apply least-privilege management design, keep administrative interfaces off untrusted networks, review response data during development, and monitor for unexpected access to router services.

Yes, the description identifies a remote attacker as the threat actor. Exploitability still depends on network reachability to the affected router functionality.

The available information does not establish whether authentication is required. The relevant conditions are access to the vulnerable interface and any authorization checks enforced by the device.

Restrict the affected service to trusted networks, require strong authorization before returning sensitive data, and minimize all externally visible responses.

Apply least-privilege management design, keep administrative interfaces off untrusted networks, review response data during development, and monitor for unexpected access to router services.

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