Severity:

HIGH RISK

(7.8)

Improper Authorization (CWE-863) in udisks2 D-Bus Mount

CVE-2026-7867

Awaiting Analysis

Vulnerability type

Category:

Improper Authorization

CWE:

CWE-863

Impact:

Local Privilege Escalation

Severity:

HIGH RISK

(7.8)

CVSS version:

3.1

Catch this CVE while code is being written

Detect vulnerable code directly in pull requests, so CVEs are fixed before merge.

Summary

A high-severity authorization flaw in udisks2 allows a local attacker with an active console session to manipulate the as-user option of the Filesystem.Mount() D-Bus method. By mounting filesystems on behalf of other users, including privileged accounts, the attacker may achieve local privilege escalation through mount point injection and mount namespace manipulation.

Affected context

The issue occurs in udisks2 deployments that expose the

org.freedesktop.UDisks2.Filesystem.Mount() D-Bus method to an active

console session and do not sufficiently authorize the requested as-user

identity. Risk is higher when privileged processes or users can observe or

interact with mount points and mount namespaces created through this path.

Exploit preconditions

  • Attack surface: The udisks2 Filesystem.Mount() D-Bus method
  • Required access: A local account with an active console session
  • Trigger point: A mount request that supplies the as-user option
  • Why exploitation is possible: Authorization checks do not adequately

bind the requested user identity to the caller's permissions, allowing

mounts to be created on behalf of arbitrary users

Why this happens

The underlying flaw is insufficient authorization of a caller-controlled

identity parameter in a privileged D-Bus operation. The service accepts or

honors the as-user value without reliably verifying that the caller is

permitted to request filesystem mounts for that identity. This behavior maps

to CWE-863: Incorrect Authorization, because access control decisions do

not correctly enforce the intended relationship between the caller, the

requested user, and the protected mount operation.

Potential impact

  • A local attacker may mount filesystems on behalf of privileged users
  • Mount point injection could enable manipulation of paths used by privileged processes
  • The attacker could influence mount namespaces visible to privileged users
  • Local privilege escalation may occur
  • Files or system resources may be exposed, altered, or obscured

General mitigation guidance

Mitigation generally focuses on enforcing authorization at the privileged

service boundary and treating identity-selection parameters as untrusted.

Common defensive patterns include:

  • Authorizing the requested user identity independently of caller-supplied parameters
  • Binding mount requests to the caller's authenticated session and permitted account
  • Applying explicit policy checks to D-Bus methods and sensitive options
  • Restricting filesystem mounting capabilities for untrusted local sessions
  • Running privileged components with the least permissions needed
  • Separating or protecting mount namespaces used by privileged services
  • Validating mount targets and preventing unsafe mount point reuse

How teams detect issues like this

Organizations can look for this issue through:

  • Static analysis and code review of D-Bus methods that accept user or identity parameters
  • Checks that authorization decisions use the authenticated caller rather than trusting request fields
  • Review of policy files governing udisks2 and filesystem-mount operations
  • Monitoring unusual mount requests involving privileged user identities
  • Auditing mount namespace changes and unexpected filesystem activity from console sessions
  • Automated security review rules for missing authorization checks on privileged IPC methods

Sources

SourceLink
access.redhat.comaccess.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:53435
access.redhat.comaccess.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:64798
access.redhat.comaccess.redhat.com/security/cve/CVE-2026-7867
bugzilla.redhat.combugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=2466747
github.comgithub.com/storaged-project/udisks/releases/tag/udisks-2.11.2
github.comgithub.com/storaged-project/udisks/security/advisories/GHSA-j42g-v9jw-6ph3

Frequently asked

questions

Generally, no. Exploitation requires local access through an active console

session and access to the relevant udisks2 D-Bus operation.

The attacker needs a local account with an active console session. The

critical missing control is authorization of the requested as-user

identity, not merely authentication to the system.

Enforce authorization at the D-Bus service boundary and verify that the

caller is permitted to request a mount on behalf of the selected user.

Caller-supplied identity values should not be trusted as proof of authority.

Apply least-privilege D-Bus policies, review identity-bearing parameters in

privileged IPC methods, isolate privileged mount namespaces, and monitor

unexpected mounts involving protected accounts.

Find out what's already
exploitable in your codebase.