Summary
A high-severity authorization flaw in udisks2 allows a local attacker with an active console session to manipulate the as-user option of the Filesystem.Mount() D-Bus method. By mounting filesystems on behalf of other users, including privileged accounts, the attacker may achieve local privilege escalation through mount point injection and mount namespace manipulation.
Affected context
The issue occurs in udisks2 deployments that expose the
org.freedesktop.UDisks2.Filesystem.Mount() D-Bus method to an active
console session and do not sufficiently authorize the requested as-user
identity. Risk is higher when privileged processes or users can observe or
interact with mount points and mount namespaces created through this path.
Exploit preconditions
- Attack surface: The udisks2 Filesystem.Mount() D-Bus method
- Required access: A local account with an active console session
- Trigger point: A mount request that supplies the
as-useroption - Why exploitation is possible: Authorization checks do not adequately
bind the requested user identity to the caller's permissions, allowing
mounts to be created on behalf of arbitrary users
Why this happens
The underlying flaw is insufficient authorization of a caller-controlled
identity parameter in a privileged D-Bus operation. The service accepts or
honors the as-user value without reliably verifying that the caller is
permitted to request filesystem mounts for that identity. This behavior maps
to CWE-863: Incorrect Authorization, because access control decisions do
not correctly enforce the intended relationship between the caller, the
requested user, and the protected mount operation.
Potential impact
- A local attacker may mount filesystems on behalf of privileged users
- Mount point injection could enable manipulation of paths used by privileged processes
- The attacker could influence mount namespaces visible to privileged users
- Local privilege escalation may occur
- Files or system resources may be exposed, altered, or obscured
General mitigation guidance
Mitigation generally focuses on enforcing authorization at the privileged
service boundary and treating identity-selection parameters as untrusted.
Common defensive patterns include:
- Authorizing the requested user identity independently of caller-supplied parameters
- Binding mount requests to the caller's authenticated session and permitted account
- Applying explicit policy checks to D-Bus methods and sensitive options
- Restricting filesystem mounting capabilities for untrusted local sessions
- Running privileged components with the least permissions needed
- Separating or protecting mount namespaces used by privileged services
- Validating mount targets and preventing unsafe mount point reuse
How teams detect issues like this
Organizations can look for this issue through:
- Static analysis and code review of D-Bus methods that accept user or identity parameters
- Checks that authorization decisions use the authenticated caller rather than trusting request fields
- Review of policy files governing udisks2 and filesystem-mount operations
- Monitoring unusual mount requests involving privileged user identities
- Auditing mount namespace changes and unexpected filesystem activity from console sessions
- Automated security review rules for missing authorization checks on privileged IPC methods

