Severity:

CRITICAL RISK

(9.1)

Hardcoded Admin Credential (CWE-798) in UltraVNC Repeater

CVE-2026-7839

Modified

Vulnerability type

Category:

Use of Hard-coded Credentials

CWE:

CWE-798

Impact:

Administrative Account Compromise and Repeater Takeover

Severity:

CRITICAL RISK

(9.1)

CVSS version:

3.1

Catch this CVE while code is being written

Detect vulnerable code directly in pull requests, so CVEs are fixed before merge.

Summary

UltraVNC Repeater initializes its HTTP administration interface with a hardcoded default password when no prior configuration exists.

Any remote attacker who can reach the repeater's HTTP port on a fresh or unmodified installation can log in as administrator using this well-known credential, gaining broad control over repeater behavior and visibility.

Affected context

This vulnerability appears in UltraVNC Repeater deployments that expose the built-in HTTP administration server, typically on TCP port 80.

It is most relevant on initial or unmodified installations where no custom admin password has been set and the settings2.txt configuration file is missing.

In such environments, the repeater silently falls back to the hardcoded password and continues to accept HTTP Basic Authentication without rate limiting or lockout.

Exploit preconditions

  • Attack surface: HTTP administration endpoint on the repeater (default TCP port 80)
  • Required access: Network-level ability to connect to the repeater's HTTP port; no prior authentication is required
  • Trigger point: Sending HTTP requests with Basic Auth credentials using the hardcoded password on a new or unmodified instance
  • Why exploitation is possible: The product embeds a fixed default admin password and uses it when configuration is absent, leaving a predictable, shared secret that can be used by any attacker who knows or discovers the value

Why this happens

The underlying bug is the use of a hardcoded administrative credential within the UltraVNC Repeater code path that initializes configuration on first run.

When settings2.txt is missing, the code copies a literal string into the saved password buffer, effectively shipping a universal default password.

This aligns with CWE-798: Use of Hard-coded Credentials, where authentication secrets are embedded in the implementation instead of being generated, set, or rotated per deployment.

Combined with the lack of rate limiting or lockout on the HTTP Basic-auth handler, this pattern leaves new installations immediately and predictably vulnerable to unauthorized administrative access.

Potential impact

  • Attackers may gain full administrator access to the UltraVNC Repeater web interface.
  • Malicious actors could modify allow/deny rules to intercept, block, or reroute remote desktop sessions.
  • Attackers can view session details and potentially correlate user activity or endpoint information.
  • Adversaries may create persistent backdoors by relaxing access controls and leaving the repeater exposed to future compromise.

General mitigation guidance

Effective mitigation focuses on eliminating reliance on hardcoded or default credentials and tightening access to administrative interfaces.

Recommended design and configuration patterns include:

  • Forcing a mandatory, unique administrator password to be set during installation or first run, with no embedded default.
  • Deriving credentials from deployment-specific secrets stored in a protected configuration mechanism rather than in source code.
  • Restricting network exposure of the administration HTTP port, for example by binding it to management networks or requiring an authenticated VPN.
  • Applying least privilege to administrative operations, so that configuration changes are auditable and limited to trusted operators.
  • Introducing basic defensive features such as login attempt throttling, lockout policies, and robust logging to detect suspicious access patterns.

How teams detect issues like this

Detecting this class of issue generally involves examining both source code and deployment configurations.

Useful approaches include:

  • Static analysis rules that flag hardcoded credential literals, particularly in authentication or configuration initialization routines.
  • Code review practices that require justification for any embedded password, key, or token-like constant.
  • Configuration audits that verify all installations have non-default, unique admin credentials and that the HTTP admin interface is not exposed to untrusted networks.
  • Security policies that prohibit shipping products with universal default administrative passwords and enforce secret management standards across projects.

Sources

SourceLink
github.comgithub.com/ultravnc/UltraVNC
uvnc.comuvnc.com/
securin.iosecurin.io/zero-days/cve-2026-7839-hardcoded-default-admin-password-adminadmi2-ultravnc-repeater

Frequently asked

questions

Yes. If the repeater's HTTP administration port is reachable over the network and the installation is in its default state, an attacker can remotely authenticate using the hardcoded password.

The attacker only needs network access to the repeater's HTTP port; no prior authentication or local system access is required on a fresh or unmodified setup.

Remove hardcoded admin credentials altogether and require a unique, user-defined password to be set during installation or first run, backed by secure secret storage.

Adopt secure-by-default configuration practices, avoid shipping products with universal default passwords, enforce secret management policies, and include automated checks in CI/CD to detect hardcoded credential patterns in code.

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