Summary
EFM ipTIME C200 firmware up to version 1.092 contains a command injection flaw in the ApplyRestore endpoint of /cgi/iux_set.cgi, where the RestoreFile parameter is passed to system-level commands without proper sanitization.
A remote attacker who can reach the device's web interface may inject arbitrary shell commands through this parameter, potentially taking full control of the affected camera.
Affected context
The vulnerability occurs in the web management interface of the ipTIME C200 network camera, specifically in the ApplyRestore functionality exposed via /cgi/iux_set.cgi.
It is relevant in deployments where:
- The device's HTTP or HTTPS management interface is reachable over the local network or internet
- Firmware version is 1.092 or earlier
- The ApplyRestore endpoint is enabled and accessible, and the
RestoreFileparameter is processed with insufficient validation
Because this is an embedded device, it may operate unattended on less protected networks, increasing the risk of opportunistic exploitation.
Exploit preconditions
- Attack surface: HTTP(S) endpoint
/cgi/iux_set.cgion the ipTIME C200 camera - Required access: Network-level ability to send HTTP requests to the device; additional authentication may or may not be required depending on configuration
- Trigger point: Invocation of the ApplyRestore functionality with a crafted
RestoreFileargument that includes shell metacharacters or injected commands - Why exploitation is possible: User-supplied input from
RestoreFileis concatenated into or otherwise incorporated into command-line arguments executed by the system shell, without adequate escaping, validation, or use of safer APIs
Why this happens
The underlying issue is an unsafe construction of operating system commands from web request parameters.
The ApplyRestore handler in /cgi/iux_set.cgi uses the RestoreFile parameter directly in shell commands, likely via functions such as system(), popen(), or equivalent wrappers, without neutralizing shell metacharacters or restricting allowed values.
This maps to:
- CWE-77: Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in a Command ('Command Injection'), because untrusted data controls part of a system command
- CWE-74: Improper Neutralization of Special Elements in Output Used by a Downstream Component, as the HTTP-layer input is forwarded to the OS command layer without appropriate encoding
The abstract pattern is: input from an external interface is treated as data but is embedded into a command string that a downstream interpreter (the shell) executes.
Potential impact
- Execution of arbitrary shell commands on the camera's operating system
- Installation of persistent malware or backdoors on the device
- Use of the camera as a foothold for lateral movement within the local network
- Unauthorized access to or manipulation of camera video streams and configuration
- Participation of the device in botnets or distributed denial-of-service (DDoS) attacks
- Loss of confidentiality and integrity of network credentials stored or proxied by the device
General mitigation guidance
Effective mitigation typically involves eliminating direct command construction from user input and narrowing trust in configuration parameters:
- Replace shell command concatenation with safer APIs that do not invoke the shell (e.g., direct function calls or exec-style calls with argument arrays and no shell parsing).
- Constrain the
RestoreFileparameter to a strict allowlist of expected values (such as predefined filenames or IDs) rather than arbitrary paths or strings. - Apply rigorous input validation and canonicalization, rejecting any value containing shell metacharacters or unexpected characters.
- Separate concerns between user input handling and system-level operations, ensuring that only validated, normalized data flows into privileged code paths.
- Run the web interface and restore-processing components with least-privilege accounts and restrict file system access, so that even if a flaw exists the blast radius is reduced.
- Consider defense-in-depth controls at the network layer (e.g., limiting management interface exposure to trusted segments) to reduce exploitable surface.
How teams detect issues like this
Detection can focus on both code-level patterns and runtime behavior:
- Static analysis and code review:
- Flag uses of
system(),popen(),exec*with concatenated strings derived from HTTP parameters. - Look for string-building routines that combine raw request fields (like
RestoreFile) with command-line fragments. - Enforce secure coding guidelines that prohibit direct shell invocation from web-layer handlers.
- Configuration and policy checks:
- Apply internal security policies that require parameterized, shell-free APIs for system operations.
- Integrate automated code review tools or SAST scanners into the firmware build pipeline to identify command injection patterns.
- Runtime monitoring:
- Where feasible, monitor for anomalous command executions from the web server process.
- Use network intrusion detection systems to flag unusual HTTP requests to
/cgi/iux_set.cgicontaining shell metacharacters or suspicious patterns in theRestoreFileparameter.
These approaches help spot both existing issues and regressions in future firmware releases.

