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CVE-2026-77767

Severity:

HIGH RISK

(7.5)

Missing Authorization (CWE-862) in Reconmap Reports

CVE-2026-77767

Deferred

Vulnerability type

Category:

Missing Authorization

CWE:

CWE-862

Impact:

Unauthorized disclosure of sensitive project and client organisation data

Severity:

HIGH RISK

(7.5)

CVSS version:

3.1

Catch this CVE while code is being written

Detect vulnerable code directly in pull requests, so CVEs are fixed before merge.

Summary

Reconmap's report preview endpoint permits unauthenticated access to project and client organisation details because it bypasses the application's administrator-only fallback authorization policy. A remote caller may enumerate project identifiers and retrieve sensitive engagement descriptions and organisation records without authentication or membership.

Affected context

The issue occurs in Reconmap deployments where the report preview action is explicitly available to anonymous callers and accepts a project identifier from the request path. The action loads the referenced project and its linked organisation, then renders identifying and engagement-related fields without an authentication, membership, or role check. Sequential project identifiers and distinct responses for missing records may make resource enumeration practical.

Exploit preconditions

  • Attack surface: Remotely reachable Reconmap API report preview endpoint
  • Required access: No authentication, project membership, or role is required
  • Trigger point: A request to the report preview action with a project identifier
  • Why exploitation is possible: The action opts out of the fallback authorization policy and does not perform an object-level authorization check before rendering project and organisation data

Why this happens

The underlying bug is an authorization coverage gap mapped to CWE-862 (Missing Authorization). A broad fallback policy protects controllers that do not declare their own authorization metadata, but an explicitly anonymous action bypasses that protection without replacing it with an equivalent resource-level access check. As a result, the application treats a user-controlled object identifier as sufficient authority to retrieve and render data belonging to other projects.

Potential impact

  • An unauthenticated caller may disclose project names and descriptions
  • Client organisation names, addresses, and URLs could be exposed
  • Attackers may enumerate which project identifiers exist
  • Sensitive penetration-testing engagement details may be aggregated
  • The disclosed information could support targeted social engineering or follow-on attacks

General mitigation guidance

Mitigation generally focuses on making authorization explicit at every

sensitive endpoint and enforcing it for the requested resource.

Common defensive patterns include:

  • Require authentication for report previews unless public sharing is an intentional, narrowly scoped feature
  • Enforce project membership, ownership, or an equivalent least-privilege permission before loading or rendering records
  • Avoid relying on a global fallback policy as the only protection for data-bearing actions
  • Use server-side object-level authorization checks after resolving the requested project
  • Apply opaque, non-sequential public references only as defense in depth, never as a replacement for authorization
  • Minimize fields included in previews and avoid exposing client records unless required
  • Return consistent responses that do not reveal whether unauthorized resources exist

How teams detect issues like this

Detection approaches can include:

  • Static analysis for anonymous endpoints that access database entities or render sensitive fields
  • Code review checks for authorization metadata that overrides global policies
  • Tests that request each data-bearing action without credentials and with users outside the target project
  • Automated authorization-matrix tests covering anonymous, authenticated, member, and administrator identities
  • API monitoring for sequential identifier access, repeated preview requests, and unusual 404-to-200 enumeration patterns
  • Policy enforcement requiring explicit resource-level authorization for endpoints that accept object identifiers

Sources

SourceLink
github.comgithub.com/reconmap/reconmap
github.comgithub.com/reconmap/reconmap/blob/56ca3748343a50c98185d53827172d8f13a6ad0f/apps/api/app/Controllers/ReportsController.cs
github.comgithub.com/reconmap/reconmap/blob/56ca3748343a50c98185d53827172d8f13a6ad0f/apps/api/app/Program.cs
github.comgithub.com/reconmap/reconmap/commit/2b2eb0cf0aa95726b4edd0045f86d2dcdb8de34d
github.comgithub.com/reconmap/reconmap/security/advisories/GHSA-mhrh-jfmr-8mmw
vulncheck.comvulncheck.com/advisories/reconmap-report-preview-endpoint-is-marked-allowanonymous-exposing-every-project-and-client-organisation-without-authentication

Frequently asked

questions

Yes. An unauthenticated remote caller may reach the report preview action when

it is exposed by the Reconmap API and supply project identifiers in requests.

No account, project membership, or administrator role is required by the

affected action. Network reachability to the endpoint is the primary

prerequisite.

Require authentication and perform a server-side object-level authorization

check confirming that the caller is permitted to view the requested project

and its linked organisation before retrieving or rendering data.

Maintain authorization matrices for every endpoint, test policy overrides

such as anonymous actions, minimize exposed fields, and monitor for

sequential resource enumeration.

Find out what's already
exploitable in your codebase.