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CVE-2026-77368

Severity:

HIGH RISK

(7.6)

Broken Access Control (CWE-639) in SeaweedFS TUS Handler

CVE-2026-77368

Deferred

Vulnerability type

Category:

Broken Access Control

CWE:

CWE-639

Impact:

Cross-tenant data tampering and unauthorized access

Severity:

HIGH RISK

(7.6)

CVSS version:

3.1

Catch this CVE while code is being written

Detect vulnerable code directly in pull requests, so CVEs are fixed before merge.

Summary

SeaweedFS version 4.39 does not recheck JWT allowed_prefixes when an existing TUS upload session is accessed by its identifier. If a tenant obtains another tenant's session ID, they may read its progress, replace its contents, delete it, or complete an upload outside their permitted filer path.

Affected context

The vulnerability occurs in SeaweedFS filer deployments that enable JWT signing and TUS resumable uploads. Session creation applies path-scoping rules, but operations on an existing session through the HEAD, PATCH, and DELETE methods may rely on the session identifier without confirming that the stored target path remains within the requesting token's allowed prefixes.

Exploit preconditions

  • Attack surface: SeaweedFS filer TUS resumable-upload endpoints
  • Required access: A valid low-privilege tenant token and knowledge or acquisition of another upload session identifier
  • Trigger point: HEAD, PATCH, or DELETE requests targeting an existing TUS session
  • Why exploitation is possible: The handler does not consistently bind the session's stored target path to the caller's JWT prefix authorization after session creation

Why this happens

The underlying bug is an authorization-check inconsistency across the lifecycle of an upload session. Path authorization is applied when a session is created, but subsequent operations use a caller-controlled session identifier without revalidating the session's target path against the caller's permitted prefixes. This maps to CWE-639: Authorization Bypass Through User-Controlled Key, because access decisions can be bypassed by referencing another user's object through its identifier.

Potential impact

  • An attacker may read another tenant's upload progress and size
  • An attacker may overwrite upload content associated with an out-of-scope path
  • An attacker may cause attacker-controlled content to be stored at a victim's filer path
  • An attacker may delete other tenants' active upload sessions
  • Cross-tenant data integrity and isolation may be compromised

General mitigation guidance

Mitigation generally focuses on enforcing authorization at every operation that accesses a resumable-upload session.

Common defensive patterns include:

  • Revalidate the caller's token scope against the session's stored target path for HEAD, PATCH, DELETE, and completion operations
  • Bind session ownership or authorization context to the session record rather than trusting the session identifier alone
  • Treat opaque identifiers as lookup keys, not proof of authorization
  • Apply deny-by-default access decisions when a session is missing, malformed, or outside the caller's permitted prefixes
  • Limit filer and tenant identities to the minimum permissions required for their upload workflows
  • Use isolated namespaces and monitoring controls to reduce cross-tenant impact

How teams detect issues like this

Organizations can look for this class of issue through:

  • Static analysis and code review checks ensuring authorization is repeated after object lookup
  • Tests that access one tenant's session identifier with another tenant's token
  • Coverage for HEAD, PATCH, DELETE, and completion paths, not only session creation
  • Policy checks requiring resource ownership or scope validation before every read, write, and delete operation
  • Audit monitoring for cross-tenant session access, unexpected path mismatches, and repeated failed authorization checks
  • Automated security review tools that identify object references used without ownership or scope enforcement

Sources

SourceLink
github.comgithub.com/seaweedfs/seaweedfs/commit/ce82e3a057080162a9fba11889157d2255815f71
github.comgithub.com/seaweedfs/seaweedfs/commit/fa549e9c83b7799d512157d728f52052912831af
github.comgithub.com/seaweedfs/seaweedfs/security/advisories/GHSA-99q7-x53r-6j4g

Frequently asked

questions

It may be exploitable through the SeaweedFS filer TUS API when the affected deployment exposes resumable-upload operations to tenants and the attacker can obtain another session identifier.

The attacker generally needs a valid JWT accepted by the filer and a session identifier belonging to another upload. The token does not need permission for the target path.

Reauthorize every operation against the session's stored target path and the caller's current JWT scope. Session identifiers should never substitute for an ownership or prefix check.

Test authorization across the complete resource lifecycle, including read, update, delete, and completion actions, using identifiers from other tenants and tokens with restricted scopes.

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