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CVE-2026-77176

Severity:

HIGH RISK

(8.1)

Path Manipulation (CWE-73) in Kata Containers genpolicy

CVE-2026-77176

Awaiting Analysis

Vulnerability type

Category:

Path Manipulation

CWE:

CWE-73

Impact:

Sensitive Information Exposure and Integrity Compromise

Severity:

HIGH RISK

(8.1)

CVSS version:

3.1

Catch this CVE while code is being written

Detect vulnerable code directly in pull requests, so CVEs are fixed before merge.

Summary

A path-manipulation flaw in Kata Containers can arise when genpolicy insufficiently validates CreateContainer mount and storage rules. A malicious host operator may be able to redirect container-rootfs mounts to sensitive host locations or provision attacker-controlled content, risking confidential data exposure and tampered inputs.

Affected context

The issue affects deployments that use Kata Containers with genpolicy to protect Confidential Containers guests. Risk is present when CreateContainer mount or storage rules are accepted without adequately constraining paths, mount targets, or provisioned content, particularly when a host operator can influence those inputs.

Exploit preconditions

  • Attack surface: Host-side container creation and policy-generation

handling

  • Required access: Malicious or compromised host-operator privileges capable

of influencing CreateContainer mount or storage parameters

  • Trigger point: Processing and applying mount or storage rules for a

container

  • Why exploitation is possible: Insufficient path and content validation may

allow attacker-controlled references to escape intended container-rootfs

boundaries or place arbitrary content at security-sensitive locations

Why this happens

The underlying bug is inadequate validation of externally influenced file paths and storage specifications. When mount sources, destinations, or provisioned content are trusted without canonicalization, boundary checks, and policy enforcement, an attacker may redirect filesystem operations to unintended locations. This behavior maps to CWE-73, External Control of File Name or Path, because controlled path data influences filesystem access or placement.

Potential impact

  • An attacker may expose confidential information from sensitive host paths.
  • An attacker could place or modify content used by the container or guest.
  • Container workloads may accept attacker-controlled input as trusted data.
  • Confidentiality and integrity protections for guest workloads may be weakened.
  • The host or related workloads could face additional compromise risk if sensitive files are affected.

General mitigation guidance

Mitigation generally focuses on treating mount and storage specifications as untrusted inputs and enforcing a narrow, explicit policy. Secure-by-default designs can allow only approved source and destination roots, reject path traversal and ambiguous path forms after canonicalization, and restrict provisioning to known content types. Validation is most effective before any filesystem operation occurs and should include both source and target paths. Host operators and container-management components should receive only the privileges required for their roles, while sensitive host paths should remain inaccessible to guest provisioning workflows where possible.

How teams detect issues like this

Detection can include static-analysis rules for filesystem operations whose paths originate from container or policy inputs, along with checks for missing canonicalization, boundary validation, and allowlisting. Code review should examine CreateContainer handling for unrestricted mount sources, destinations, storage paths, and content injection points. Runtime monitoring can flag mounts targeting protected host locations or unexpected writes outside approved roots. Admission and policy enforcement can require explicit path-prefix and privilege constraints, and automated security review tools may help identify these patterns in changes.

Sources

SourceLink
access.redhat.comaccess.redhat.com/security/cve/CVE-2026-77176
bugzilla.redhat.combugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=2517502
github.comgithub.com/kata-containers/kata-containers/security/advisories/GHSA-fmg6-v47x-52wr
openwall.comopenwall.com/lists/oss-security/2026/08/20/19

Frequently asked

questions

Exploitation is primarily tied to the host-control plane rather than an

unauthenticated network request. A malicious or compromised host operator

must be able to influence container creation mount or storage rules.

The relevant access is authority to submit or modify CreateContainer inputs,

genpolicy-related configuration, or the host-side workflow that processes

those values. The exact scope depends on deployment permissions.

Validate and canonicalize every mount and storage path before use, allow only

explicitly approved roots and destinations, and prevent provisioning actions

from reaching sensitive host locations.

Treat policy and container-creation inputs as untrusted, apply least

privilege, enforce protected-path policies, and test path-boundary behavior

in code review, CI, and runtime monitoring.

Find out what's already
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