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CVE-2026-77079

Severity:

HIGH RISK

(8.8)

Authorization Bypass (CWE-639) in n8n Project Roles

CVE-2026-77079

Analyzed

Vulnerability type

Category:

Authorization Bypass

CWE:

CWE-639

Impact:

Privilege Escalation and Unauthorized Project Administration

Severity:

HIGH RISK

(8.8)

CVSS version:

3.1

Catch this CVE while code is being written

Detect vulnerable code directly in pull requests, so CVEs are fixed before merge.

Summary

n8n contains an authorization bypass in the custom project-role deletion and reassignment workflow. A user with only the narrow role:manageProject global scope could affect custom roles in projects they were not authorized to manage, potentially causing users to receive the built-in project:admin role and gaining administrative control over those projects.

Affected context

The vulnerability occurs in n8n deployments that support custom project roles and allow a role-management operation to reassign role holders during deletion. The affected authorization path verifies that the reassignment target exists and is project-scoped, but may not verify that the acting user is authorized for the specific project associated with the custom role. Risk depends on the availability of the role-management permission and the presence of affected custom roles.

Exploit preconditions

  • Attack surface: n8n project role management functionality
  • Required access: An authenticated user holding the narrow role:manageProject global scope
  • Trigger point: Deletion of a custom project role with a reassignment target
  • Authorization gap: The workflow checks target-role existence and scope but does not adequately enforce authorization for the affected project
  • Resulting condition: Role holders may be reassigned to the built-in project:admin role, including the initiating user

Why this happens

The underlying bug is an authorization decision based on incomplete object-level validation. The deletion and reassignment path validates properties of the selected role but fails to bind the operation to the project on which the requester is authorized to act. This maps to CWE-639: Authorization Bypass Through User-Controlled Key, because an insufficiently authorized user can influence the identifier or object relationship used in an access-control decision.

Potential impact

  • An attacker may delete custom project roles outside their authorized scope.
  • Existing role holders could be reassigned to a more privileged built-in role.
  • The attacker could gain administrative control over otherwise inaccessible projects.
  • Unauthorized users could modify project permissions and access sensitive project data.
  • Project ownership, workflows, credentials, or operational settings could be altered.

General mitigation guidance

Mitigation generally focuses on enforcing object-level authorization at every stage of role deletion and reassignment.

Common defensive patterns include:

  • Verify that the requester is authorized for the specific project associated with the custom role.
  • Re-check authorization for both the role being deleted and the reassignment target.
  • Avoid treating global role-management scopes as implicit access to every project.
  • Apply least privilege to role-management capabilities and separate administrative duties where practical.
  • Use secure-by-default reassignment behavior that does not grant broader privileges than the deleted role.
  • Make authorization checks server-side, centralized, and independent of client-supplied identifiers.

How teams detect issues like this

Organizations can look for this class of issue through:

  • Static analysis and code review rules requiring project-scope checks before role mutations.
  • Review of endpoints that accept project, role, or reassignment identifiers from callers.
  • Tests that attempt cross-project role deletion and reassignment with narrowly scoped accounts.
  • Audit-log analysis for role deletions followed by unexpected assignment to built-in administrative roles.
  • Policy enforcement requiring authorization decisions to be based on server-resolved resource ownership and scope.

Automated application-security review tools may help identify missing object-level authorization checks, but authorization behavior should also be verified with focused integration tests.

Sources

SourceLink
github.comgithub.com/n8n-io/n8n/security/advisories/GHSA-xhmh-8fgr-xqhj
vulncheck.comvulncheck.com/advisories/n8n-before-authorization-bypass-via-custom-role-deletion

Frequently asked

questions

It may be exploitable through n8n's authenticated role-management interface when the affected functionality is exposed and the attacker has the required global scope. It is not an unauthenticated issue based on the described conditions.

The attacker needs an authenticated account with the narrow role:manageProject global scope. They do not necessarily need legitimate access to the target project.

Enforce server-side, object-level authorization for the project containing the custom role before allowing deletion or reassignment, and ensure reassignment cannot grant unintended privileges.

Use centralized authorization checks, test cross-tenant and cross-project access boundaries, validate every resource identifier against the caller's permissions, and monitor sensitive role changes.

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