Summary
A cross-site request forgery vulnerability in Netcore NR255-V firmware allows forged web requests to change WAN and LAN network settings.
The issue becomes risky when an authenticated administrator visits attacker-controlled content while signed in to the device's management interface.
Affected context
The vulnerability affects Netcore NR255-V firmware version 1.5.130703 and its web management interface. It involves the wan_config_set_cgi, wan_num_set_cgi, and lan_ip_change_cgi endpoints when they accept state-changing requests without sufficient protection against cross-origin request forgery.
Exploit preconditions
- Attack surface: Web-based router management interface
- Required access: An authenticated administrator must have an active management session
- Trigger point: A state-changing request to a WAN or LAN configuration endpoint
- Why exploitation is possible: The affected endpoints may process forged cross-site requests without requiring a request-specific anti-CSRF token or equivalent origin validation
Why this happens
The underlying bug is insufficient request-origin validation for state-changing administrative operations. When an application relies primarily on a user's existing session credentials without requiring an unpredictable request-specific token or equivalent control, an external site may cause the browser to submit unintended authenticated requests.
This behavior maps to CWE-352: Cross-Site Request Forgery, in which an application fails to verify that a sensitive request was intentionally initiated by the authenticated user.
Potential impact
- An attacker could alter WAN connection settings
- An attacker could modify LAN IP configuration
- Network connectivity could be disrupted
- Administrative access to the device could be made more difficult or redirected
- Internal network exposure or misrouting could increase
General mitigation guidance
Mitigation generally focuses on ensuring that every state-changing administrative request is demonstrably intentional and protected by the authenticated application.
Common defensive patterns include:
- Requiring unpredictable, session-bound anti-CSRF tokens for state-changing requests
- Validating the request
OriginorRefererwhere appropriate as a defense-in-depth measure - Using restrictive, appropriately configured cookie settings such as
SameSite - Avoiding state changes through cross-site-safe methods such as unauthenticated GET requests
- Limiting administrative privileges and restricting management access to trusted network segments
- Applying secure-by-default management-interface policies and explicit confirmation for sensitive network changes
How teams detect issues like this
Organizations can look for CSRF weaknesses through:
- Static analysis and code review checks for state-changing handlers without token or origin validation
- Review of CGI endpoints that modify network, authentication, or device-management settings
- Dynamic testing using cross-origin request simulations in controlled environments
- Web application firewall or gateway policies that inspect unexpected origins and sensitive request patterns
- Automated security testing tools that identify missing CSRF protections, used as a supplement to manual review

