Summary
Hi.Events webhook delivery can be abused to make server-side requests to loopback, private-network, cloud metadata, or other internal destinations. The risk arises when a previously accepted webhook URL changes through DNS or redirects, because the destination is not revalidated during dispatch and the resulting response may be exposed through webhook logs.
Affected context
The vulnerability affects event and organizer webhook integrations when a destination is validated only during registration. A public hostname may later resolve to an internal address, or the destination may redirect to one, while the dispatch path continues to use the stored URL without validating the resolved address or each redirect target. Webhook response bodies being retained in logs can make data returned by internal services available through the webhook logs endpoint.
Exploit preconditions
- Attack surface: Webhook registration and server-side webhook dispatch
- Required access: Ability to register or influence a webhook destination and read the associated webhook logs
- Trigger point: Delivery of an event or organizer webhook
- Why exploitation is possible: Address validation occurs at registration rather than dispatch, DNS is not re-resolved safely at use time, and redirect targets are not checked before requests are followed
Why this happens
The underlying issue is a time-of-check-to-time-of-use failure in URL validation. Hi.Events resolves and filters the hostname when a webhook is registered, but later trusts the stored URL during delivery. Without revalidating the resolved address and every redirect hop, a hostname can be changed after registration or can redirect the server toward an internal destination. This behavior maps to CWE-918, Server-Side Request Forgery, because attacker-influenced URL handling causes the application server to issue requests to unintended network locations. Returning the response body through webhook logs adds an information-disclosure path.
Potential impact
- An attacker could access loopback or private-network services
- Requests could reach cloud instance metadata endpoints
- Internal service responses may be exposed through webhook logs
- The application could disclose network topology or service credentials
- Internal endpoints could receive unintended authenticated or privileged requests
General mitigation guidance
Mitigation generally focuses on treating webhook URLs as untrusted at every
use, not only when they are registered.
Common defensive patterns include:
- Revalidate the hostname and resolved address immediately before dispatch
- Pin the validated destination address for the request where feasible
- Validate every redirect target, or disable redirect following by default
- Reject loopback, private, link-local, reserved, multicast, and equivalent IPv6 or transition addresses
- Resolve and connect in a way that prevents DNS rebinding between validation and use
- Restrict outbound network access with egress controls and least-privilege service accounts
- Minimize or redact webhook response bodies retained in logs
- Apply authorization checks before exposing webhook delivery records
How teams detect issues like this
Organizations can look for SSRF risks through:
- Static analysis rules for server-side HTTP clients that accept user-controlled URLs
- Code review checks for URL validation performed only at creation or registration time
- Review of HTTP-client defaults, especially automatic redirect following
- Tests covering DNS changes, redirect chains, IPv4 and IPv6 representations, and transition addresses
- Network monitoring for application requests to loopback, private, link-local, and metadata ranges
- Policy enforcement that limits production workloads to approved outbound destinations
- Automated security review tools that flag untrusted URL flows and missing egress restrictions

