Summary
AzuraCast exposes Liquidsoap custom configuration fields through a profile-editing endpoint that may not enforce the permission intended to protect them. A station manager with profile access could potentially cause operating-system commands to run when generated Liquidsoap configuration is processed and the backend restarts the station.
Affected context
The issue occurs in AzuraCast station profile management when backend configuration fields are included in a broadly authorized deserialization group. Those values may then be written verbatim into a generated Liquidsoap script, while the dedicated Liquidsoap configuration endpoint applies a stronger broadcasting permission boundary. Risk depends on the attacker's station permissions, configuration mutability, and whether the affected backend restart and synchronization behavior are active.
Exploit preconditions
- Attack surface: The station profile-edit API endpoint and its configuration deserialization path
- Required access: A user able to edit a station profile, potentially with profile permission but without broadcasting permission
- Trigger point: Processing generated Liquidsoap configuration during a backend restart or synchronization task
- Why exploitation is possible: Public configuration properties are assigned without field-level authorization, and selected values are emitted into an executable Liquidsoap script without sufficiently reducing their input trust
Why this happens
The vulnerability combines an authorization boundary failure with unsafe code generation. A deserialization group exposes backend configuration fields through an endpoint guarded only by profile permissions, while generic property assignment does not apply separate permission checks to each field. The configuration writer then places attacker-influenced values into a Liquidsoap script, where command-execution functionality may interpret them as executable logic. This behavior maps primarily to CWE-94: Improper Control of Generation of Code, with CWE-863: Incorrect Authorization describing the missing field-level permission enforcement.
Potential impact
- An authorized station manager could cause operating-system commands to execute in the backend environment
- The station or associated application process could be compromised
- Sensitive configuration data may be accessed or altered
- Other services or hosts could be affected if the backend has excessive privileges or network access
- Broadcast content, station data, or operational workflows could be disrupted
General mitigation guidance
Mitigation generally focuses on preserving the intended authorization boundary and preventing user-controlled values from becoming executable configuration.
Common defensive patterns include:
- Applying field-level authorization checks during deserialization and property assignment
- Excluding privileged Liquidsoap configuration fields from general profile-edit operations
- Requiring the dedicated broadcasting permission for all custom configuration changes
- Treating generated script content as a code boundary and using structured, allowlisted configuration APIs where possible
- Validating configuration values against strict schemas and rejecting executable constructs when they are not required
- Running backend and Liquidsoap processes with least privilege and restricted filesystem and network access
- Separating station-management permissions from configuration and process-control permissions
How teams detect issues like this
Detection can combine authorization review, data-flow analysis, and runtime monitoring.
Useful approaches include:
- Static analysis for generic property assignment from request data into privileged entities
- Searches for deserialization groups that expose sensitive configuration fields
- Code review checks ensuring endpoint permissions match field sensitivity
- Taint analysis tracking request-controlled values into generated scripts or command-execution APIs
- Policy checks requiring allowlisted configuration schemas for script-generating components
- Audit logging and alerting for profile updates that modify backend or Liquidsoap configuration fields
- Monitoring unexpected process creation, configuration rewrites, and backend restarts associated with station changes

