Summary
A high-severity code injection vulnerability in cc-connect affects the Authenticate function in its webhook implementation. When attacker-controlled input reaches the exec argument without adequate restrictions, a remote attacker may cause unintended code execution.
Affected context
The vulnerability occurs in cc-connect deployments up to version 1.4.1 when the webhook authentication flow processes the exec argument using a code-execution-capable path. Risk depends on whether the affected webhook is remotely reachable and whether incoming values can influence command or code execution behavior.
Exploit preconditions
- Attack surface: The remotely reachable webhook authentication endpoint
- Required access: Ability to send requests to the affected webhook; valid authentication may not be required if the endpoint accepts unauthenticated input
- Trigger point: Processing of the
execargument in theAuthenticatefunction - Why exploitation is possible: Attacker-controlled input may reach an execution sink without sufficient allowlisting, separation, or contextual validation
Why this happens
The underlying flaw is an unsafe connection between externally supplied data and an execution mechanism. Rather than treating the exec argument strictly as inert data or as a constrained operation selected from trusted values, the application permits input to influence executable behavior. This maps most directly to CWE-94, Code Injection, and is also related to CWE-74, Injection, because untrusted data crosses an execution boundary.
Potential impact
- An attacker may execute arbitrary code in the cc-connect process context.
- The attacker could access application data, secrets, or connected services.
- The vulnerability may enable modification of application behavior or stored data.
- A compromised service account could permit further movement within the hosting environment.
General mitigation guidance
Mitigation generally focuses on removing direct execution of user-controlled
values and reducing trust in webhook inputs.
Common defensive patterns include:
- Replacing dynamic execution with fixed, explicitly mapped operations.
- Applying strict allowlists for commands, actions, and argument formats.
- Separating data parsing from execution decisions made only by trusted server-side logic.
- Validating inputs against a narrow schema before they reach sensitive sinks.
- Applying authentication, authorization, rate limiting, and network restrictions to webhook endpoints.
- Running the service with least privilege and limiting access to secrets and host resources.
How teams detect issues like this
Organizations can look for this class of issue through:
- Static analysis rules that identify request-derived data reaching execution APIs.
- Code review checks for
exec-like operations in webhook, callback, and authentication handlers. - Data-flow analysis tracing HTTP parameters into subprocess, interpreter, template, or dynamic evaluation sinks.
- Runtime monitoring for unexpected child processes, command activity, or anomalous webhook requests.
- Policy enforcement requiring approved operation mappings and explicit input schemas.
Automated code review and software composition analysis tools may help identify related patterns, but findings should be validated against the application's actual data flow.

