Summary
Jinher OA 1.0 contains a SQL injection vulnerability in the UserSel.aspx endpoint, where the DeptIDList parameter is incorporated into database queries without proper sanitization.
A remote attacker can manipulate this parameter to alter backend SQL statements, potentially accessing or modifying sensitive data and impacting application integrity.
Affected context
The vulnerability appears in the Jinher OA 1.0 web application within the PlanSummarize module, specifically in the UserSel.aspx page.
It manifests when HTTP requests containing the DeptIDList argument are processed and the value is used to build SQL queries dynamically.
The risk is present in deployments where this endpoint is reachable over a network (intranet or internet) and user-controlled input is passed into SQL statements without robust validation or parameterization.
Exploit preconditions
- Attack surface: HTTP interface to /C6/JHSoft.Web.PlanSummarize/UserSel.aspx
- Required access: Network access to the Jinher OA web application; the exact authentication requirements are unclear, but the issue can be triggered wherever the endpoint is accessible.
- Trigger point: Supplying crafted values in the DeptIDList parameter in a request to UserSel.aspx.
- Why exploitation is possible: The server-side code appears to concatenate DeptIDList directly into SQL commands or fails to properly constrain its influence on the query, enabling attackers to inject additional SQL fragments that are executed by the database engine. This aligns with CWE-89 (Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an SQL Command) and CWE-74 (Improper Neutralization of Special Elements in Output Used by a Downstream Component).
Why this happens
The core issue is the construction of SQL queries using untrusted input without correct neutralization or parameter binding.
Instead of using prepared statements or validated, strongly-typed parameters, the DeptIDList argument is likely concatenated into a query string or passed through insufficient filtering.
This pattern allows attacker-controlled characters (such as quote delimiters, operators, and keywords) to break out of intended query structure and inject new SQL logic.
Conceptually, this is a classic example of CWE-89: Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an SQL Command, and more broadly of CWE-74, where user data is allowed to alter the behavior of a downstream SQL interpreter.
Potential impact
- Retrieval of data the user should not be able to access (e.g., other departments' records or sensitive organizational information)
- Modification or deletion of existing records, impacting business workflows and data integrity
- Creation of new unauthorized records or escalation of privileges through manipulated data
- Potential enumeration of database schema and structure, aiding further attacks
- In some configurations, possible execution of database-level procedures that increase access to the underlying system
General mitigation guidance
Effective mitigation focuses on eliminating direct inclusion of untrusted data in SQL commands and constraining how user input can influence query logic.
Recommended patterns include:
- Using parameterized queries or prepared statements for all database operations involving DeptIDList and similar inputs, ensuring the database treats user data strictly as values, not executable syntax.
- Applying strict server-side validation and normalization so that DeptIDList is constrained to expected formats (for example, numeric IDs or a well-defined list) before it is used.
- Implementing whitelisting for allowable identifiers or using mapping tables instead of accepting raw client-supplied IDs for query construction.
- Centralizing database access logic into a data access layer where secure query-building patterns are enforced by default.
- Applying least-privilege principles to database accounts so that even if a query is abused, access is limited to only the necessary tables and operations.
How teams detect issues like this
Organizations can detect this kind of vulnerability through a combination of code-level and behavioral analysis:
- Static analysis: Configure rules to flag dynamic SQL string concatenation involving request parameters (such as DeptIDList) and to detect non-parameterized
SqlCommand,OleDbCommand, or ORM query constructions. - Code review: During manual reviews, scrutinize all places where HTTP parameters or query string values are used in SQL queries, especially in ASP.NET WebForms pages like UserSel.aspx and related code-behind files.
- Runtime monitoring: Use database activity monitoring to detect anomalous queries containing unexpected concatenated fragments, comment markers, or tautological conditions.
- Security testing: Incorporate automated and manual SQL injection tests into CI/CD pipelines and pre-release assessments, focusing on endpoints that accept identifiers, filters, or list parameters that influence query logic.

