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CVE-2026-76213

Severity:

HIGH RISK

(7.4)

Brute-Force (CWE-307) in phpMyFAQ Two-Factor Login

CVE-2026-76213

Analyzed

Vulnerability type

Category:

Authentication Brute Force

CWE:

CWE-307

Impact:

Two-Factor Authentication Bypass and Unauthorized Account Access

Severity:

HIGH RISK

(7.4)

CVSS version:

3.1

Catch this CVE while code is being written

Detect vulnerable code directly in pull requests, so CVEs are fixed before merge.

Summary

phpMyFAQ contains a brute-force weakness in its two-factor authentication flow because the failed-attempt counter is tied to the session and can be reset through successful password re-authentication. An attacker who already knows a valid password may obtain fresh sessions and repeatedly guess TOTP codes without being constrained by the intended five-attempt limit.

Affected context

The issue may affect phpMyFAQ deployments where TOTP verification uses a session-scoped failure counter and permits a new session to reset that counter after password re-authentication. Exploitation depends on the attacker possessing valid account credentials and being able to initiate repeated authentication sessions against the affected login flow.

Exploit preconditions

  • Attack surface: The web application's password and two-factor authentication endpoints
  • Required access: A valid username and password, or equivalent credentials
  • Trigger point: Repeated TOTP verification attempts across newly established sessions
  • Why exploitation is possible: The failed-attempt limit is maintained per session and is reset after successful password re-authentication, allowing repeated guessing beyond the intended threshold

Why this happens

The underlying bug is an ineffective authentication-attempt control. The application tracks TOTP failures within an individual session rather than enforcing an account- or identity-linked limit that persists across sessions. Because successful password re-authentication can create a fresh session and reset the counter, an attacker can avoid the intended restriction. This behavior maps to CWE-307: Improper Restriction of Excessive Authentication Attempts.

Potential impact

  • An attacker may discover a valid TOTP code through repeated guessing
  • An attacker could bypass the intended two-factor protection for an account
  • Compromised accounts may expose private FAQs, user data, or administrative functions
  • Attackers could make configuration changes or perform actions permitted by the affected account

General mitigation guidance

Mitigation generally focuses on making authentication-attempt controls persistent, identity-aware, and resistant to session renewal.

Common defensive patterns include:

  • Enforcing failed-attempt limits across sessions and authentication channels
  • Associating throttling with the account, authenticator, and relevant risk signals rather than only a session identifier
  • Applying progressive delays, temporary lockouts, or other rate controls after repeated TOTP failures
  • Avoiding counter resets that can be triggered solely by password re-authentication
  • Requiring robust session invalidation and rotation without weakening authentication controls
  • Applying least privilege to accounts so a compromised identity has limited effect

How teams detect issues like this

Organizations can assess this weakness through:

  • Static and dynamic tests that verify failed-attempt counters persist across new sessions
  • Code review for counters keyed only by session identifiers or reset after password validation
  • Authentication policy checks requiring account-level or risk-based throttling for MFA attempts
  • Monitoring repeated password successes followed by high-volume TOTP failures across many sessions
  • Automated security testing that evaluates whether session renewal bypasses rate limits

Sources

SourceLink
github.comgithub.com/thorsten/phpMyFAQ/security/advisories/GHSA-f98m-hcjv-7rp9
vulncheck.comvulncheck.com/advisories/phpmyfaq-before-2fa-brute-force-via-session-scoped-throttle

Frequently asked

questions

Generally, no. The described attack requires a valid password or equivalent access to the first authentication factor.

It may, when the counter is session-scoped and successful password re-authentication creates a session with a reset counter.

Enforce TOTP attempt limits in a persistent, account-aware manner that cannot be reset simply by creating a new session.

Test MFA controls across session renewal, apply layered rate limiting and monitoring, and review authentication logic for counters that are scoped only to transient client state.

Find out what's already
exploitable in your codebase.