Severity:

HIGH RISK

(7.3)

OS Command Injection in Sunwood-ai-labs

CVE-2026-7593

Deferred

Vulnerability type

Category:

OS Command Injection

CWE:

CWE-77, CWE-78

Impact:

Remote Code Execution

Severity:

HIGH RISK

(7.3)

CVSS version:

3.1

Catch this CVE while code is being written

Detect vulnerable code directly in pull requests, so CVEs are fixed before merge.

Summary

Sunwood-ai-labs command-executor-mcp-server up to version 0.1.0 contains an OS command injection vulnerability in the execute_command function of the MCP Interface (src/index.ts).

When untrusted input is passed into system-level command execution without proper sanitization or restriction, a remote attacker can execute arbitrary OS commands on the hosting environment.

Affected context

The vulnerability affects deployments of command-executor-mcp-server (versions up to 0.1.0) where the MCP Interface is exposed as part of an application, tool, or service that accepts commands or parameters from external sources.

It is particularly risky when:

  • The MCP server is reachable over a network (e.g., from clients, plugins, or automation)
  • User-controlled or externally sourced data is passed to execute_command
  • There is no intermediary layer enforcing strict whitelists or parameter validation

In such contexts, the server effectively becomes a bridge between remote input and the underlying operating system shell.

Exploit preconditions

  • Attack surface: Network-accessible MCP Interface that invokes execute_command.
  • Required access: Ability to send requests or messages that ultimately control or influence the arguments passed into execute_command.
  • Trigger point: Invocation of the vulnerable execute_command code path where user-controlled data is interpolated into or concatenated with OS-level commands.
  • Why exploitation is possible: The implementation appears to construct or invoke shell commands using untrusted input without proper escaping, validation, or use of safer APIs, enabling attackers to break out of the intended command context and inject arbitrary operations.

Why this happens

This issue stems from improper construction of operating system commands using unvalidated input inside the execute_command function.

Conceptually, the code treats externally controlled data as trusted and incorporates it into shell commands—likely through string concatenation, formatting, or use of shell-invoking APIs—without strict validation or contextual encoding.

This aligns with CWE-78: Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an OS Command ('OS Command Injection') and is closely related to CWE-77: Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in a Command ('Command Injection').

The insecure pattern is: take external data → directly embed it into a command line → execute it in a shell context, giving the attacker influence over what the operating system runs.

Potential impact

  • Remote execution of arbitrary OS commands under the privileges of the MCP server process
  • Reading, modifying, or deleting application and system files accessible to the service account
  • Pivoting to other internal services or infrastructure reachable from the compromised host
  • Installation of backdoors, cryptominers, or other persistent malware
  • Exfiltration of secrets such as API tokens, credentials, or configuration data
  • Disruption of service availability through destructive or resource-exhausting commands

General mitigation guidance

Effective mitigation focuses on eliminating direct shell construction with untrusted input and reducing the privileges and capabilities of the execution environment:

  • Prefer safe command execution APIs that accept arguments as arrays and do not invoke a shell, reducing interpretation of metacharacters.
  • Introduce strict allowlists for commands and arguments that can be executed, limiting functionality to a narrow, predefined set.
  • Validate and normalize all input before use, rejecting values that fall outside expected patterns (e.g., disallowing control characters, shell metacharacters, or unexpected tokens).
  • Avoid passing user-controlled strings into command interpreters or multiplexers; instead, map high-level actions to internal functions where possible.
  • Run the MCP server under a dedicated, least-privileged account with minimal filesystem and network permissions.
  • Apply defense-in-depth controls such as OS-level sandboxing, containers, or execution policies to limit the impact of potential command execution.

How teams detect issues like this

Detection can be approached both at the code level and operationally:

  • Static analysis: Configure analysis rules to flag uses of shell-spawning APIs (e.g., generic exec/spawn variants) where arguments originate from network input or other untrusted sources, especially when commands are built via string concatenation.
  • Code review: During review of the MCP Interface and similar components, look for patterns where user input is passed into command execution without:
  • Argument separation (arrays)
  • Whitelisting or strict validation
  • Contextual escaping for shell metacharacters
  • Policy enforcement: Integrate security checks into CI/CD pipelines to prevent merging new code with unsanitized command execution patterns, and enforce secure coding guidelines for system command usage.
  • Runtime monitoring: Collect and monitor logs of process creation, unusual command lines, and unexpected tool invocations originating from the MCP server process; configure alerts for anomalous or high-risk commands.

Sources

SourceLink
github.comgithub.com/Sunwood-ai-labs/command-executor-mcp-server/
github.comgithub.com/Sunwood-ai-labs/command-executor-mcp-server/issues/6
vuldb.comvuldb.com/submit/805507
vuldb.comvuldb.com/vuln/360546
vuldb.comvuldb.com/vuln/360546/cti

Frequently asked

questions

Yes. As described, exploitation is possible remotely when an attacker can send data that controls or influences the parameters passed into the execute_command function via the MCP Interface.

The attacker typically needs the same level of access required to interact with the MCP server as a client (e.g., via a network API, plugin interface, or other integration). No direct system login is necessary if the interface itself is exposed.

The safest pattern is to avoid constructing shell commands from user input entirely. Where executing external tools is unavoidable, use non-shell APIs with argument arrays, enforce strict allowlists and input validation, and handle all user-supplied data as opaque values rather than command fragments.

Establish coding standards that prohibit dynamic shell command construction with untrusted input, back them with automated static analysis in CI, and require security-focused reviews for any code that interacts with the operating system or external executables. Combine this with least-privilege deployment practices and regular security testing of externally exposed interfaces.

Find out what's already
exploitable in your codebase.