Severity:

HIGH RISK

(7.3)

SQL Injection in Electronic Judging System Login

CVE-2026-7555

Deferred

Vulnerability type

Category:

SQL Injection

CWE:

CWE-74, CWE-89

Impact:

Authentication Bypass and Data Compromise

Severity:

HIGH RISK

(7.3)

CVSS version:

3.1

Catch this CVE while code is being written

Detect vulnerable code directly in pull requests, so CVEs are fixed before merge.

Summary

The Electronic Judging System 1.0 is vulnerable to SQL injection through the Username parameter in /intrams/login.php.

A remote attacker can manipulate this input to interfere with database queries, potentially bypassing authentication or accessing sensitive data.

Affected context

This vulnerability occurs in the login functionality of the Electronic Judging System 1.0, specifically within /intrams/login.php.

It is relevant when user-supplied credentials, such as Username, are incorporated into backend SQL queries without robust input handling or parameterization.

The issue is most pronounced in deployments where the web application server has broad database privileges and error output or response behavior differs based on query results.

Exploit preconditions

  • Attack surface: Public-facing web interface at /intrams/login.php.
  • Required access: Network access to the application; no prior authentication is required to reach the vulnerable parameter.
  • Trigger point: Submission of crafted input in the Username field during the login process.
  • Why exploitation is possible: The login code dynamically constructs SQL statements using untrusted input from Username without using prepared statements or sufficient neutralization, allowing injected SQL fragments to alter query semantics.

Why this happens

The underlying issue is improper construction of SQL queries with user input, mapping to CWE-89: Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an SQL Command ('SQL Injection').

Instead of using parameterized queries or prepared statements, the application likely concatenates the Username value directly into a query string, treating data as code.

Additionally, the lack of robust output encoding and context-aware sanitization (related to CWE-74: Improper Neutralization of Special Elements in Output) can amplify the impact by exposing detailed database behavior that aids exploitation.

This pattern allows attackers to inject control characters and SQL syntax into the login query, influencing authentication checks or data retrieval.

Potential impact

  • Bypass of authentication, allowing an attacker to log in as arbitrary users, including administrative accounts.
  • Unauthorized reading of sensitive data stored in the database (e.g., user records, scores, or judging-related information).
  • Modification or deletion of application data, potentially altering competition results or corrupting the system state.
  • Enumeration of database structure (tables, columns) that can facilitate further exploitation.
  • Depending on database configuration, possible execution of database-level commands that impact availability or integrity.

General mitigation guidance

Effective mitigation focuses on eliminating the direct mixing of user input with SQL command text and reducing the trust boundary around authentication inputs.

Recommended defensive patterns include:

  • Using parameterized queries or prepared statements for all database interactions involving user input, especially in login routines.
  • Centralizing database access through a data access layer that prohibits dynamic query construction with raw user input.
  • Applying strict server-side input validation for credentials, limiting Username to expected character sets and lengths without relying on validation as the sole defense.
  • Adopting least-privilege database accounts so that the application user has only the minimal permissions required (e.g., no ability to drop tables or access unrelated schemas).
  • Minimizing detailed database error exposure in HTTP responses, using generic error messages while logging full details server-side.

These measures create multiple layers of defense, reducing the chance that a single coding mistake leads to exploitable SQL injection.

How teams detect issues like this

Detection typically combines code-centric and behavior-centric approaches:

  • Static analysis: Configure rules to flag string concatenation or interpolation used in SQL query construction, particularly in authentication flows like /intrams/login.php.
  • Code review: During manual review, scrutinize all login and credential-handling code for direct use of request parameters in SQL queries and confirm parameterization is consistently applied.
  • Dynamic testing: Use web application security testing tools or custom scripts to send SQL meta-characters in the Username parameter and observe for anomalies such as SQL errors, unexpected logins, or unusual response timing.
  • Logging and monitoring: Monitor database logs and web server logs for suspicious patterns, such as repeated failed logins with unusual Username values containing quotes, comment markers, or SQL keywords.

Integrating these checks into CI/CD pipelines and regular security testing cycles helps surface SQL injection risks before deployment.

Sources

SourceLink
github.comgithub.com/nidieaaa/test/issues/9
itsourcecode.comitsourcecode.com/
vuldb.comvuldb.com/submit/805852
vuldb.comvuldb.com/vuln/360363
vuldb.comvuldb.com/vuln/360363/cti

Frequently asked

questions

The vulnerability is remotely exploitable by anyone who can reach the login page. Because the Username parameter is unauthenticated and directly tied to authentication logic, the exposure is significant, especially on internet-facing deployments.

An attacker only needs network access to the web application; no valid credentials are required. They can attempt SQL injection by sending crafted values in the Username field on the login form or equivalent HTTP requests.

The most robust fix is to refactor the login code to use parameterized queries or prepared statements exclusively, removing all dynamic string concatenation of user input within SQL queries. Coupling this with least-privilege database accounts and centralized query-building patterns significantly reduces similar risks.

Future prevention should combine secure coding standards (mandatory parameterized queries), automated static analysis for SQL construction, regular security-focused code reviews of authentication and input-handling modules, and developer training on injection risks. Establishing these as non-negotiable practices in the development lifecycle helps prevent recurrence across the codebase.

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