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CVE-2026-75415

Severity:

HIGH RISK

(7.5)

Broken Access Control (CWE-639) in AntFlow V2.0.0 API

CVE-2026-75415

Deferred

Vulnerability type

Category:

Incorrect Access Control

CWE:

CWE-639

Impact:

Sensitive Information Disclosure and User Impersonation

Severity:

HIGH RISK

(7.5)

CVSS version:

3.1

Catch this CVE while code is being written

Detect vulnerable code directly in pull requests, so CVEs are fixed before merge.

Summary

AntFlow V2.0.0 contains an incorrect access control weakness in its request-logging filter, which uses a user ID supplied through a request header as the basis for identity verification. An attacker who can submit requests to the affected interface may forge that identity information, potentially accessing sensitive data associated with another user.

Affected context

The vulnerability occurs in deployments of AntFlow V2.0.0 where JiMuMDCCommonsRequestLoggingFilter.java processes a client-controlled request header as trusted identity information. Risk depends on whether affected endpoints rely on this header without independently validating the authenticated principal or binding the identity to a trusted session or token.

Exploit preconditions

  • Attack surface: HTTP request handling for endpoints using the affected request filter
  • Required access: Ability to send requests to an affected application interface; valid authentication may or may not be required depending on deployment controls
  • Trigger point: Processing of a request containing a forged user identity header
  • Why exploitation is possible: The application treats client-supplied identity data as authoritative instead of deriving the user identity from a trusted authentication context

Why this happens

The underlying bug is an authorization design failure in which a request header controlled by the client is used as the core identity verification mechanism. Because the header is not inherently trustworthy, an attacker may replace it with another user's identifier and have downstream access checks operate on the forged identity. This maps to CWE-639: Authorization Bypass Through User-Controlled Key, where user-controlled values influence access to another user's resources.

Potential impact

  • An attacker could impersonate another application user
  • Sensitive information could be disclosed across user or tenant boundaries
  • Unauthorized actions could be performed under a forged identity
  • Audit records could associate activity with the wrong user
  • The vulnerability could support broader account or data compromise when combined with other weaknesses

General mitigation guidance

Mitigation generally focuses on removing client-controlled identity attributes from authorization decisions and establishing a trusted authentication boundary.

Common defensive patterns include:

  • Deriving the authenticated subject from a verified session, signed token, or server-managed security context
  • Treating identity-related request headers as untrusted metadata unless they are inserted by a trusted intermediary and protected from direct client access
  • Enforcing object-level authorization for every requested resource
  • Binding authorization decisions to the authenticated principal rather than to request parameters or headers
  • Applying least privilege and tenant isolation to limit exposure if an authorization check fails
  • Preserving trustworthy audit context from the authentication layer

How teams detect issues like this

Organizations can look for this weakness through:

  • Static analysis that identifies request headers flowing into user lookup, authorization, or resource-selection logic
  • Code review checks for identity values accepted directly from HTTP clients
  • Tests that attempt cross-user resource access while varying identity headers
  • Policy enforcement requiring authenticated principals to originate from trusted security middleware
  • Runtime monitoring for unusual identity-header values, cross-user access patterns, or mismatches between token subjects and application user IDs

Automated security review tools may help identify flows where client-controlled values influence authorization decisions.

Sources

SourceLink
github.comgithub.com/Y4y17/CVE/blob/main/AntFlow/Identity%20verification%20mechanism.md

Frequently asked

questions

Potentially. The weakness is exposed through HTTP request handling, so exploitation may be possible remotely when an affected endpoint is reachable and accepts the forged identity information.

The requirement depends on endpoint configuration. Some deployments may require only network access, while others may require a valid account; the central prerequisite is the ability to submit requests processed by the vulnerable identity logic.

Do not use client-supplied identity headers as authoritative credentials. Derive identity from a verified authentication context and perform object-level authorization against that principal.

Enforce centralized authentication, prohibit direct trust in client-controlled identity fields, add cross-user authorization tests, and use static or policy-based checks to detect untrusted data entering access-control decisions.

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