Severity:

HIGH RISK

(7.3)

Improper Authorization in GoClaw and GoClaw Lite

CVE-2026-7505

Deferred

Vulnerability type

Category:

Improper Authorization

CWE:

CWE-266, CWE-285

Impact:

Unauthorized Access to Protected Operations

Severity:

HIGH RISK

(7.3)

CVSS version:

3.1

Catch this CVE while code is being written

Detect vulnerable code directly in pull requests, so CVEs are fixed before merge.

Summary

GoClaw and GoClaw Lite up to version 3.8.5 contain an improper authorization flaw in their RPC handler component, allowing certain operations to be performed without sufficient access checks.

When exposed over the network, a remote attacker may be able to invoke privileged RPC actions they should not have access to, potentially compromising application integrity or data.

Affected context

The vulnerability resides in the RPC handler logic of GoClaw and GoClaw Lite deployments that expose RPC endpoints to clients or other services.

It becomes relevant when:

  • RPC endpoints are reachable over a network (LAN, WAN, or internet)
  • The server relies on the RPC handler to enforce access control decisions
  • Multiple roles, tenants, or privilege levels are expected to be isolated by authorization checks

Environments with shared infrastructure, multi-user access, or machine-to-machine integrations are particularly affected, as trust assumptions between callers and RPC methods may be violated.

Exploit preconditions

  • Attack surface: Network-accessible RPC endpoints exposed by GoClaw / GoClaw Lite instances.
  • Required access: Ability to send RPC requests to the affected handler; no prior authenticated session or privileged role may be required depending on configuration.
  • Trigger point: Invocation of specific RPC methods where authorization checks are missing, incomplete, or incorrectly enforced.
  • Why exploitation is possible: The RPC handler does not consistently validate the caller's identity, role, or permissions before executing sensitive operations, aligning with CWE-266/285 patterns where privilege boundaries are not properly enforced.

Why this happens

The underlying issue is a broken authorization design within the RPC handler.

Instead of centralizing and strictly enforcing access control for each RPC method, the implementation either:

  • Omits authorization checks for certain operations,
  • Applies them inconsistently, or
  • Relies on implicit trust in the caller or context.

This maps to CWE-285 (Improper Authorization) and CWE-266 (Incorrect Privilege Assignment): the system assigns or assumes privileges for RPC requests without robust verification of the caller's rights and fails to constrain operations according to least privilege.

Potential impact

  • Unauthorized invocation of administrative or privileged RPC commands
  • Access to data or configuration intended only for higher-privileged users or internal services
  • Modification or deletion of resources managed by GoClaw / GoClaw Lite
  • Escalation from a low-privilege account or unauthenticated position to more powerful capabilities within the application context
  • Disruption of service availability through misuse of maintenance or control RPC functions

General mitigation guidance

Addressing this class of issue typically involves strengthening and centralizing authorization for all RPC endpoints.

Common defensive patterns include:

  • Implementing a single, well-reviewed authorization layer that every RPC method must pass through before execution
  • Enforcing least privilege by explicitly defining which roles or identities may invoke each RPC operation
  • Applying default deny semantics so that new or unclassified RPC methods are not callable until explicit policies are defined
  • Designing RPC interfaces to separate public, user-level, and administrative operations, minimizing exposure of high-impact methods
  • Reducing trust in network location or caller assumptions, and instead relying on authenticated identities and consistent policy checks

How teams detect issues like this

Organizations can detect similar authorization issues using a combination of review and automated analysis:

  • Static analysis: Look for RPC handler functions that are callable over the network but lack calls to centralized authorization or policy-check routines.
  • Code review: Verify that every RPC entrypoint explicitly enforces role, tenant, or permission checks and does not rely on implicit trust based on caller context or network origin.
  • Security testing: Use structured fuzzing or penetration testing to invoke RPC methods with downgraded or absent credentials and observe whether privileged actions succeed.
  • Policy enforcement: Maintain secure coding guidelines requiring all new RPC endpoints to register an authorization policy; integrate automated checks in CI to ensure compliance.

Sources

SourceLink
github.comgithub.com/nextlevelbuilder/goclaw/
github.comgithub.com/nextlevelbuilder/goclaw/commit/406022e79f4a18b3070a446712080571eff11e30
github.comgithub.com/nextlevelbuilder/goclaw/issues/866
github.comgithub.com/nextlevelbuilder/goclaw/pull/950
github.comgithub.com/nextlevelbuilder/goclaw/releases/tag/v3.9.0
vuldb.comvuldb.com/submit/803458
vuldb.comvuldb.com/vuln/360314
vuldb.comvuldb.com/vuln/360314/cti

Frequently asked

questions

Yes, if the RPC endpoints are exposed over a network, a remote attacker who can reach the service may exploit the improper authorization to invoke restricted operations.

In many cases, the attacker only needs network access to the RPC interface.

Depending on deployment, they may not need valid credentials or may exploit a low-privilege identity to gain access to higher-privilege RPC methods.

The safest pattern is to enforce a centralized, mandatory authorization layer for all RPC methods, applying default-deny rules and explicit role/permission checks per method, while adhering to least-privilege principles.

Future development should require that every new RPC endpoint:

  • Be registered with an explicit authorization policy
  • Undergo code review focusing on access control
  • Be validated by automated tests that assert unauthorized requests are denied

Additionally, treating RPC boundaries as untrusted and avoiding reliance on implicit trust (such as network location) can significantly reduce the risk of similar vulnerabilities.

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