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CVE-2026-75035

Severity:

HIGH RISK

(7.7)

Authorization Bypass (CWE-639) in Rancher Token Store

CVE-2026-75035

Analyzed

Vulnerability type

Category:

Authorization Bypass

CWE:

CWE-639

Impact:

Sensitive Information Disclosure and Token Exposure

Severity:

HIGH RISK

(7.7)

CVSS version:

3.1

Catch this CVE while code is being written

Detect vulnerable code directly in pull requests, so CVEs are fixed before merge.

Summary

A broken object-level authorization flaw in Rancher Manager allows an authenticated non-administrative user to query another user's tokens by supplying a selector for that user. The response may expose token metadata and salted bearer-token hashes, creating a risk of credential analysis and unauthorized access.

Affected context

The issue occurs in Rancher Manager's ext.cattle.io/v1 Token store when authorization filtering is applied to list or watch operations. Deployments are at risk when a non-administrative authenticated user can submit selectors naming resources owned by other users and the service fails to preserve the caller's internal ownership constraint.

Exploit preconditions

  • Attack surface: Authenticated Rancher API access to Token store list or watch operations
  • Required access: A valid account that is not an administrator
  • Trigger point: Supplying a label selector that references another user's token resources
  • Why exploitation is possible: The requested selector can cause the service to discard its internal owner filter instead of returning an empty result

Why this happens

The underlying bug is an authorization-filter composition error. A caller-controlled selector is allowed to replace or remove a server-side ownership restriction, causing a resource query to return objects outside the caller's authorized scope.

This behavior maps to CWE-639: Authorization Bypass Through User-Controlled Key, where user-controlled identifiers or selection criteria influence access decisions without reliably enforcing ownership or authorization boundaries.

Potential impact

  • Unauthorized users may list or watch other users' token resources
  • Token metadata may be disclosed across account boundaries
  • Salted bearer-token hashes may be exposed for offline analysis
  • Compromised or weakly protected tokens could enable unauthorized API access
  • The incident may increase the risk of lateral movement or privilege abuse

General mitigation guidance

Mitigation generally focuses on preserving server-side authorization constraints regardless of caller-supplied selectors.

Common defensive patterns include:

  • Apply ownership and authorization filters after processing user-controlled selectors
  • Treat caller-provided resource names and labels as narrowing criteria, never as replacements for policy filters
  • Return empty results when a requested object is outside the caller's scope
  • Separate administrative and non-administrative query paths
  • Minimize exposure of token metadata and avoid returning bearer-token material when it is not required
  • Use least-privilege roles and short-lived, narrowly scoped tokens
  • Add regression tests for cross-user list, watch, and direct-object access

How teams detect issues like this

Organizations can look for this class of issue through:

  • Static analysis and code review checks for user-controlled selectors replacing authorization predicates
  • Tests that compare results for same-user and cross-user resource queries
  • Review of list and watch handlers for consistent server-side ownership enforcement
  • API policy checks that verify non-administrative identities cannot observe resources owned by other users
  • Audit-log monitoring for unusual cross-user token enumeration or watch activity
  • Automated security testing that exercises object-level authorization across multiple identities

Sources

SourceLink
github.comgithub.com/rancher/rancher/releases/tag/v2.15.1

Frequently asked

questions

Any authenticated non-administrative user may be able to exploit it if their account can access the affected Token store operations.

No. The issue specifically concerns authorization enforcement for non-administrative callers, although the exact reachable API surface depends on deployment permissions.

Affected responses may reveal other users' token metadata and stored salted bearer-token hashes. Exposure of these values does not automatically reveal plaintext tokens, but it can increase credential risk.

Enforce immutable server-side ownership and authorization filters for every list and watch request, and ensure caller-controlled selectors can only narrow an already-authorized result set.

Find out what's already
exploitable in your codebase.