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CVE-2026-75002

Severity:

HIGH RISK

(7.1)

IMAP Command Injection (CWE-77) in Roundcube Webmail

CVE-2026-75002

Analyzed

Vulnerability type

Category:

Command Injection

CWE:

CWE-77

Impact:

Information Disclosure and Privilege Escalation

Severity:

HIGH RISK

(7.1)

CVSS version:

3.1

Catch this CVE while code is being written

Detect vulnerable code directly in pull requests, so CVEs are fixed before merge.

Summary

A command injection vulnerability in Roundcube Webmail can arise when mail search handling and IMAP LITERAL+ byte counts become desynchronized. Under conditions that allow crafted mail or IMAP input to reach the affected processing path, an attacker may disclose information or increase privileges.

Affected context

The issue affects Roundcube Webmail deployments using vulnerable versions before 1.6.18 or versions in the 1.7.x branch before 1.7.3. It occurs in processing that combines mail-search input with IMAP commands using LITERAL+ byte-count semantics, where inconsistent length handling can alter command boundaries.

Exploit preconditions

  • Attack surface: Roundcube's webmail mail-search and IMAP command-processing paths
  • Required access: Typically an authenticated webmail session or another ability to cause crafted input to be processed, depending on deployment configuration
  • Trigger point: Handling of a search operation or IMAP data containing a LITERAL+ byte count
  • Why exploitation is possible: Byte-count desynchronization can cause subsequent data to be interpreted as part of an unintended IMAP command

Why this happens

The underlying bug is an input-boundary and command-construction failure associated with inconsistent interpretation of IMAP LITERAL+ byte counts. When the parser and downstream command handling disagree about the length or boundaries of supplied data, attacker-controlled content may influence the resulting IMAP command stream. This behavior maps to CWE-77, Command Injection, because data intended as input can be interpreted as commands within a downstream interpreter.

Potential impact

  • An attacker may disclose mailbox or other sensitive information.
  • An attacker could influence IMAP operations beyond the intended search.
  • A user account's privileges may be escalated under affected conditions.
  • Mailbox integrity or application trust boundaries could be weakened.
  • Additional accounts or backend resources may be exposed depending on permissions.

General mitigation guidance

Mitigation generally focuses on preserving strict command and data boundaries

throughout IMAP processing.

Common defensive patterns include:

  • Treating search terms and message data strictly as data, never as command fragments.
  • Using protocol-aware parsers that validate LITERAL+ lengths before processing content.
  • Enforcing canonical length calculations and rejecting malformed or inconsistent inputs.
  • Applying context-specific encoding and parameterization when constructing IMAP commands.
  • Limiting the privileges available to webmail and mail-service accounts.
  • Reducing backend access and mailbox visibility to the minimum required by each user.
  • Keeping security controls and dependency-management processes aligned with vendor-maintained releases without relying on ad hoc parser changes.

How teams detect issues like this

Organizations can look for:

  • Static-analysis findings involving string concatenation or interpolation of user-controlled values into IMAP commands.
  • Code-review signals such as manual byte-count calculations, duplicated length parsing, or parser state changes after malformed literals.
  • Tests that compare declared and actual literal lengths, including boundary, Unicode, truncation, and unexpected-command cases.
  • Webmail and IMAP logs showing malformed searches, repeated literal-length errors, unexpected command sequences, or access outside normal mailbox behavior.
  • Policy enforcement requiring parameterized protocol APIs and security review for code that constructs interpreter commands.

Neutral automated code-review and protocol-fuzzing tools may help identify boundary-handling inconsistencies earlier.

Sources

SourceLink
github.comgithub.com/roundcube/roundcubemail/commit/404d43f1b0125319c3cf8c9e3df39074c0cb80ad
github.comgithub.com/roundcube/roundcubemail/commit/73233abe581b3b31cefd00041c7086c40e1793ea
github.comgithub.com/roundcube/roundcubemail/releases/tag/1.6.18
github.comgithub.com/roundcube/roundcubemail/releases/tag/1.7.3
roundcube.netroundcube.net/news/2026/08/09/security-updates-1.6.18-and-1.7.3

Frequently asked

questions

It may be exploitable through the Roundcube webmail interface when crafted input reaches the affected mail-search or IMAP processing path. The exact scope depends on enabled features, authentication controls, and backend permissions.

Often, access to a webmail session or the ability to submit mail-search input is expected, although deployment-specific integrations may change the required access level.

Use corrected vendor-maintained software and ensure IMAP parsing validates literal lengths and preserves a strict separation between user data and commands.

Use protocol-aware parameterization, reject malformed length fields, test parser state transitions with fuzzing and boundary cases, and apply least privilege to webmail and mail-service accounts.

Find out what's already
exploitable in your codebase.