Summary
The standalone telemetry server in openssl_encrypt uses a hardcoded default secret key when hashing API keys. An attacker who knows or obtains this key may predict or forge API key hashes, potentially bypassing telemetry API authentication.
Affected context
The vulnerability occurs in standalone telemetry server deployments that use the affected configuration and retain the embedded default secret for API key hashing. Risk increases when telemetry endpoints are network-accessible and the default value is known, reused, or exposed through source code, packages, documentation, or deployment artifacts.
Exploit preconditions
- Attack surface: Telemetry server API authentication
- Required access: Knowledge of the hardcoded default secret, or access to an artifact or system that reveals it
- Trigger point: API key hashing and authentication verification
- Why exploitation is possible: A fixed, predictable secret allows an attacker to reproduce or manipulate the hashes used to authenticate API requests
Why this happens
The underlying issue is the use of a hardcoded secret in application logic or default configuration for a security-sensitive cryptographic operation. Because the same embedded value can be discovered and reused across deployments, API key hash generation and verification do not depend on a protected, deployment-specific secret. This behavior maps to CWE-798: Use of Hard-coded Credentials, with the hardcoded key functioning as a credential or authentication secret.
Potential impact
- An attacker may forge valid-looking API key hashes
- Unauthorized users could gain access to telemetry API functions
- Telemetry data may be read, modified, or deleted depending on granted privileges
- Compromised API access could support further abuse of connected monitoring systems
General mitigation guidance
Mitigation generally focuses on removing embedded authentication secrets and ensuring that cryptographic keys are deployment-specific.
Common defensive patterns include:
- Generating unique secrets during deployment or initial setup
- Loading secrets from a protected secret-management system or environment boundary
- Rejecting known default values and requiring explicit secure configuration
- Separating API authentication keys from application source and distributable artifacts
- Limiting telemetry API privileges and network exposure according to least-privilege principles
- Supporting controlled key rotation and revocation without service-wide downtime where practical
How teams detect issues like this
Organizations can identify this class of issue through:
- Static analysis searches for literal strings used in hashing, signing, or authentication code
- Code review checks for default secrets, fallback keys, and deterministic credential material
- Secret-scanning rules applied to source repositories, packages, container images, and deployment manifests
- Runtime policy checks that reject known defaults and require externally supplied secrets
- Tests confirming that separate deployments do not share authentication keys
Automated security review tools may help flag hardcoded credentials and insecure default configuration patterns.

