Summary
VetCoders mcp-server-semgrep 1.0.0 contains an OS command injection vulnerability in the MCP Interface, where an attacker-controlled ID argument is incorporated into shell commands without proper sanitization.
A remote attacker who can influence this ID parameter can execute arbitrary system commands on the host running the MCP server, potentially leading to full compromise of the underlying environment.
Affected context
This vulnerability occurs in deployments using VetCoders mcp-server-semgrep 1.0.0 where the MCP Interface exposes functionality that processes an ID argument through functions such as analyze_results, filter_results, export_results, compare_results, scan_directory, and create_rule.
It is relevant in contexts where the server accepts IDs from clients or other services and passes them into command-line operations, scripts, or Semgrep invocations without robust validation or escaping.
The risk increases when the MCP server is reachable over a network and is configured to process IDs originating from untrusted or indirectly controlled sources.
Exploit preconditions
- Attack surface: Network-accessible MCP interface for mcp-server-semgrep
- Required access: Ability to send requests or structured messages that control the ID parameter processed by the vulnerable functions
- Trigger point: Invocation of
analyze_results,filter_results,export_results,compare_results,scan_directory, orcreate_rulewith crafted ID values that are incorporated into shell commands - Why exploitation is possible: The implementation incorporates the ID argument into OS command strings or executes it through a shell without adequate input validation, quoting, or use of safe process-spawning APIs, allowing injection of additional commands or arguments
Why this happens
The root cause is improper handling of externally supplied data when constructing or executing system-level commands.
Instead of treating the ID value as data that must be strictly validated, normalized, and safely passed as an argument, the code likely interpolates it directly into a command string or uses a shell-based execution mechanism.
This aligns with CWE-78: Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an OS Command, and closely relates to CWE-77, where meta-characters (such as ;, &&, |, or backticks) are not stripped or neutralized.
As a result, the boundary between command logic and user data is blurred, enabling crafted IDs to alter command structure and behavior during runtime.
Potential impact
- Execution of arbitrary OS commands with the privileges of the mcp-server-semgrep process
- Access to sensitive files, credentials, or configuration on the host
- Lateral movement within the environment via installed tools or network access
- Tampering with analysis results, rule sets, or scan outputs
- Service disruption, including denial of service by resource exhaustion or destructive commands
General mitigation guidance
Mitigation typically focuses on enforcing a strict separation between command logic and user-controlled data.
Useful defensive patterns include:
- Avoiding shell invocation entirely by using safe process-spawning APIs (e.g.,
spawn/execFilewith argument arrays) that do not invoke a command shell - Implementing strict allowlists for expected ID formats (e.g., UUIDs, numeric identifiers) and rejecting any values that do not conform
- Removing or encoding shell meta-characters and other dangerous tokens from inputs that may influence OS commands
- Running the MCP server under a dedicated, least-privileged account with limited file system and network access
- Isolating the service via containers or sandboxing so that a compromise of the process has constrained blast radius
- Minimizing the scope of external tools and utilities available to the runtime environment
How teams detect issues like this
Detecting this class of vulnerability involves both code-level and operational monitoring approaches:
- Static analysis: Configure linters or SAST tools to flag uses of shell-based execution APIs (e.g.,
child_process.exec/execSync) where arguments derive from external inputs, particularly fields likeidor similar identifiers - Code review: During manual review, look for string concatenation or template literals that combine command strings with request parameters or untrusted data in the MCP Interface layer
- Policy enforcement: Introduce internal guidelines that mandate parameterized process execution and disallow raw shell command construction in application code
- Runtime monitoring: Use command auditing, system logs, and EDR solutions to detect unusual command patterns originating from the mcp-server-semgrep process, such as unexpected utilities or multi-command chains

