Severity:

HIGH RISK

(7.3)

Path Traversal in mail-mcp-bridge Message Handling

CVE-2026-7386

Deferred

Vulnerability type

Category:

Path Traversal

CWE:

CWE-22

Impact:

Unauthorized File System Access

Severity:

HIGH RISK

(7.3)

CVSS version:

3.1

Catch this CVE while code is being written

Detect vulnerable code directly in pull requests, so CVEs are fixed before merge.

Summary

A path traversal vulnerability in the mail-mcp-bridge server allows manipulation of the message_ids argument to influence filesystem paths used by the application.

When user-controlled message identifiers are incorporated into file operations without proper validation, a remote attacker may be able to read or interact with files outside the intended directory scope.

Affected context

This issue arises in deployments of the mail-mcp-bridge service (up to version 1.3.3) where the server component in src/mail_mcp_server.py processes a message_ids parameter coming from remote clients.

The vulnerability is present when these identifiers are used to build filesystem paths or reference on-disk message content without normalizing, constraining, or validating the requested locations against an allowed directory.

Any environment that exposes this functionality over a network and accepts attacker-controlled message identifiers can be affected.

Exploit preconditions

  • Attack surface: Network-exposed mail-mcp-bridge server endpoint that accepts message_ids.
  • Required access: Ability to send crafted requests to the service (no local filesystem access required; may or may not require authentication depending on deployment).
  • Trigger point: Server-side logic that translates the message_ids argument into filesystem paths used to access stored messages or related resources.
  • Why exploitation is possible: The implementation combines user-supplied identifiers with filesystem paths without sufficient normalization or enforcement of an allowed base directory, enabling traversal sequences (such as parent-directory references) to escape the intended storage location.

Why this happens

The underlying bug is a classic path traversal issue where application code directly concatenates or interpolates user-supplied data into filesystem paths.

Instead of treating the message_ids input as untrusted and constraining it to a known safe directory or canonical identifier format, the code allows directory navigation patterns to influence the resolved path.

This behavior aligns with CWE-22: Improper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory, where absence of path canonicalization and boundary checks lets attackers access files outside the intended directory tree.

Potential impact

  • Access to files outside the intended message storage directory could be possible.
  • Exposure of configuration files, logs, or other sensitive data that the service account can read.
  • Interference with application state or data integrity if write or delete operations are also influenced by the traversal.
  • Potential leverage for further compromise when combined with other vulnerabilities (e.g., reading credentials, keys, or internal endpoints).

General mitigation guidance

Risk reduction should focus on both path handling discipline and input trust minimization:

  • Design file access APIs so that user input never directly controls filesystem paths; use opaque, validated identifiers mapped to server-side paths.
  • Enforce strict validation on identifiers such as message_ids (e.g., whitelist allowed characters and patterns, reject directory separators and traversal tokens).
  • Resolve and normalize paths before use, then verify that they remain within a pre-defined base directory.
  • Apply least-privilege to the service account so that, even if traversal is attempted, accessible files are minimal.
  • Consider segregating sensitive configuration and operational data from the directories accessible to the service.

How teams detect issues like this

Organizations can detect this class of issue with a combination of code-focused and operational techniques:

  • Static analysis: Configure rules to flag string concatenation or formatting where user-supplied data flows into file APIs (e.g., open, os.path.join, os.remove, directory listing functions) without normalization or checks.
  • Code review: Look for usage of request parameters such as message_ids in filesystem operations; verify canonicalization, whitelist validation, and base-path enforcement.
  • Security testing: Use dynamic application security testing (DAST) or manual penetration tests to probe file-handling endpoints with traversal patterns and observe responses.
  • Runtime monitoring: Monitor logs and telemetry for suspicious path patterns (e.g., sequences like ../, unexpected absolute paths) and alert on anomalous filesystem access by the application process.

Sources

SourceLink
github.comgithub.com/fatbobman/mail-mcp-bridge/
github.comgithub.com/fatbobman/mail-mcp-bridge/commit/638b162b26532e32fa8d8047f638537dbdfe197a
github.comgithub.com/fatbobman/mail-mcp-bridge/issues/2
github.comgithub.com/fatbobman/mail-mcp-bridge/releases/tag/1.3.4
vuldb.comvuldb.com/submit/803096
vuldb.comvuldb.com/vuln/360107
vuldb.comvuldb.com/vuln/360107/cti

Frequently asked

questions

Exploitability depends on how and where the mail-mcp-bridge server is exposed.

If the affected endpoint is reachable over a network and accepts untrusted message_ids, an attacker can attempt traversal without needing local access.

Not inherently.

The key requirement is the ability to send crafted requests that control the message_ids parameter; whether this requires authentication depends entirely on the deployment's access controls and API exposure.

Replace direct use of user-controlled identifiers in file paths with a mapping from validated, opaque IDs to server-side paths, and enforce that all resolved paths remain within a restricted base directory after normalization.

Additionally, apply strict input validation to disallow directory separators, traversal sequences, and unexpected characters.

Establish a standard file-access abstraction that always:

  • Treats all external identifiers as untrusted.
  • Normalizes and validates paths.
  • Verifies that paths stay under an approved root directory.

Combine this with secure coding guidelines, static analysis rules targeting path usage, and security review of any code that touches the filesystem.

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