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CVE-2026-73669

Severity:

HIGH RISK

(7.3)

Missing Authentication (CWE-306) in Hue MQTT Broker

CVE-2026-73669

Awaiting Analysis

Vulnerability type

Category:

Missing Authentication

CWE:

CWE-306

Impact:

Unauthorized data access and control of connected devices

Severity:

HIGH RISK

(7.3)

CVSS version:

3.1

Catch this CVE while code is being written

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Summary

The Signify Philips Hue Bridge Pro firmware exposes an embedded Mosquitto MQTT broker on all network interfaces without requiring authentication. An unauthenticated attacker with network access to the broker may read MQTT data and control connected lights.

Affected context

The vulnerability occurs in Hue Bridge Pro deployments where the embedded Mosquitto MQTT service is reachable over the network and does not enforce client authentication. Risk is higher when the bridge is accessible from untrusted networks, exposed through network segmentation gaps, or otherwise reachable by unauthorized devices.

Exploit preconditions

  • Attack surface: Network-accessible MQTT service exposed by the Hue Bridge Pro
  • Required access: Network connectivity to the MQTT broker; no prior authentication is required
  • Trigger point: Connection to MQTT topics and publication of control messages
  • Why exploitation is possible: The broker accepts client interactions without verifying the identity or authorization of the connecting party

Why this happens

The underlying issue is an MQTT broker configured to accept network connections without authentication or effective authorization checks. This maps to CWE-306: Missing Authentication for Critical Function, because operations involving device telemetry and light control can be performed without establishing the requester's identity.

Potential impact

  • An attacker may read MQTT messages or other broker-accessible data
  • An attacker could control connected lights without authorization
  • Unauthorized control may disrupt lighting or connected-device behavior
  • Exposed device information could support further network reconnaissance

General mitigation guidance

Mitigation generally focuses on enforcing authentication and authorization at the MQTT service boundary while reducing unnecessary network exposure.

Common defensive patterns include:

  • Require authenticated clients before permitting MQTT connections
  • Apply topic-level authorization so clients can access only permitted data and controls
  • Bind services to trusted interfaces rather than all network interfaces where feasible
  • Segment smart-home and device-management networks from untrusted clients
  • Use firewall policies to restrict access to the broker
  • Apply least privilege to service accounts, topics, and device-control operations
  • Prefer secure-by-default broker configurations that reject anonymous access

How teams detect issues like this

Organizations can identify this class of issue through:

  • Network scans that detect MQTT listeners and test whether anonymous connections are accepted
  • Configuration reviews for anonymous access, missing listener authentication, and unrestricted interface binding
  • Code and firmware reviews for broker startup settings that enable unauthenticated operation
  • Monitoring for unexpected MQTT clients, topic subscriptions, publications, or device-control events
  • Policy enforcement requiring authentication, authorization, and network segmentation for IoT messaging services

Automated security scanners and configuration-analysis tools may help identify exposed brokers and anonymous access patterns.

Sources

SourceLink
raw.githubusercontent.comraw.githubusercontent.com/cisagov/CSAF/develop/csaf_files/IT/white/2026/va-26-225-01.json
cve.orgcve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2026-73669
philips-hue.comphilips-hue.com/en-us/support/release-notes/bridge-pro
philips-hue.comphilips-hue.com/en-us/support/security-advisory

Frequently asked

questions

It may be exploitable by any unauthenticated party that can reach the Hue Bridge Pro MQTT service over the network. Exploitability depends on network exposure and access controls.

No application account is required when the MQTT service is reachable and accepts unauthenticated connections.

Require client authentication and enforce topic-level authorization, while restricting broker access to trusted network segments.

Use secure-by-default broker settings, prohibit anonymous access, minimize exposed interfaces, segment IoT networks, and continuously monitor MQTT connections and control activity.

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