Summary
OpenChoreo's Backstage backend enabled settings that disabled the default authentication policy and permitted guest access outside development environments. As a result, unauthenticated users may access API endpoints, read catalog and scaffolder data, and create or delete catalog locations when the affected backend is exposed.
Affected context
The issue occurs in OpenChoreo deployments using the Backstage backend with authentication protections disabled by default. It becomes risky when the backend's API routes are reachable by users who have not authenticated, particularly in environments where catalog, scaffolder, or administrative functionality is exposed beyond a trusted development network.
Exploit preconditions
- Attack surface: OpenChoreo Backstage backend API endpoints
- Required access: Network reachability to the exposed backend; no valid account may be required
- Trigger point: Requests to unauthenticated
/api/*routes and related catalog or scaffolder functionality - Why exploitation is possible: Authentication policy and guest-provider safeguards are configured to allow unauthenticated access, so sensitive operations may be processed without identity verification
Why this happens
The underlying defect is a missing authentication control caused by insecure default configuration. The backend hardcoded settings that disabled the default authentication policy and allowed guest authentication outside development, causing API authorization boundaries to be bypassed.
This maps to CWE-306: Missing Authentication for Critical Function, where a component fails to require authentication before granting access to protected functionality.
Potential impact
- Unauthenticated users may read software catalog information
- Unauthenticated users may access scaffolder logs
- Attackers may create or delete catalog locations
- Internal project or deployment details could be disclosed
- Catalog integrity and developer workflows may be affected
- Broader compromise could occur if exposed API functions provide additional privileged capabilities
General mitigation guidance
Mitigation generally focuses on requiring authentication and authorization for every protected API route.
Common defensive patterns include:
- Enable authentication by default outside isolated development environments
- Remove or tightly restrict guest authentication providers
- Apply route-level authorization checks to catalog, scaffolder, and administrative operations
- Separate read-only and mutating permissions using least privilege
- Restrict backend network exposure through ingress, firewall, and service policies
- Treat identity and access configuration as controlled, reviewed policy rather than hardcoded permissive defaults
- Add security tests that verify unauthenticated requests cannot access protected endpoints
How teams detect issues like this
Organizations can identify this class of issue through:
- Configuration review for disabled default authentication or unrestricted guest providers
- Static analysis and policy checks for hardcoded permissive authentication settings
- Code review signals involving API routes without authentication or authorization middleware
- Integration tests that send unauthenticated requests to catalog and scaffolder endpoints
- Access-log analysis for anonymous reads or mutations against
/api/*routes - Deployment policies requiring authenticated access for non-development Backstage services

