Summary
Trigger.dev packet presign routes accept a caller-controlled filename without adequately restricting path traversal sequences. On multi-organization self-hosted instances, a project API key may therefore read or overwrite another organization's offloaded task payloads and outputs.
Affected context
The issue occurs in Trigger.dev deployments using the affected packet presign routes and object-store integration. It requires a filename to influence presigned URL or request generation without being securely confined to the intended packets/<projectRef>/<env>/ storage prefix; the risk is especially significant in self-hosted environments serving multiple organizations.
Exploit preconditions
- Attack surface: Packet presign API routes in the web application
- Required access: A valid project API key or other access capable of invoking the presign functionality
- Trigger point: Processing a caller-controlled filename while generating a presigned URL or request
- Why exploitation is possible: Path traversal components can cause storage-key resolution to escape the project and environment prefix, potentially reaching objects belonging to another organization
Why this happens
The vulnerability results from treating a caller-controlled filename as a trusted object-store path component. When traversal elements are passed into storage-key construction without canonicalization and confinement checks, the resulting key may resolve outside the directory-like prefix intended for the request. This behavior maps to CWE-22: Improper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory, applied here to object-store key generation and authorization boundaries.
Potential impact
- An attacker may read another organization's offloaded task payloads or outputs
- An attacker may overwrite objects belonging to another organization
- Confidential workflow data could be disclosed
- Stored task results could be tampered with or replaced
- Cross-tenant isolation could be weakened on shared self-hosted instances
General mitigation guidance
Mitigation generally focuses on treating filenames as untrusted identifiers and enforcing storage-boundary checks before presigned URLs or requests are created.
Common defensive patterns include:
- Rejecting traversal components and unsafe path syntax
- Canonicalizing candidate object keys before authorization decisions
- Verifying that resolved keys remain within the intended project and environment prefix
- Deriving storage paths from trusted server-side identifiers rather than caller-provided paths
- Binding authorization checks to the project, organization, environment, and object being accessed
- Using separate storage namespaces or credentials where practical to limit cross-organization access
- Applying least-privilege permissions to object-store credentials
- Avoiding storage APIs that implicitly normalize paths without an explicit containment check
How teams detect issues like this
High-level detection can include:
- Static analysis for concatenation or interpolation of request-controlled filenames into object-store keys
- Code review checks for missing canonicalization, containment validation, or tenant-bound authorization
- Tests covering traversal markers, encoded separators, absolute-path forms, and normalization edge cases
- Policy checks requiring server-derived tenant and environment prefixes for presigned operations
- Audit logging for presign requests, resolved object keys, project identifiers, and organization boundaries
- Monitoring for unusual cross-project object access or repeated presign requests involving malformed filenames
Automated security review tools may help identify untrusted path construction, but findings should be validated against the storage provider's key-normalization behavior.

