Summary
File Browser fails to revalidate access rules for descendant files during recursive copy, rename, and delete operations. An authenticated user who can access a parent directory may use these operations to act on files that should be denied, undermining confidentiality and integrity controls.
Affected context
The issue occurs in File Browser deployments that use path-based access rules to isolate files or directories. It becomes risky when an authenticated user is permitted to operate on a parent directory while descendant objects have more restrictive rules, and recursive copy, rename, or delete operations do not independently enforce those descendant restrictions.
Exploit preconditions
- Attack surface: File management operations exposed by the File Browser application
- Required access: An authenticated account with permission to operate on an allowed parent directory
- Trigger point: Recursive copy, rename, or delete functionality
- Why exploitation is possible: The application authorizes the parent operation without consistently validating access rules for every affected descendant
Why this happens
The underlying bug is an authorization decision that is applied to an allowed parent path but not re-evaluated for each descendant affected by a recursive operation. This creates an authorization bypass through an insufficiently validated resource identifier, matching CWE-639, where access control decisions fail to account for the actual object being accessed or modified.
Potential impact
- An attacker may copy denied files into an accessible location
- An attacker may rename protected files or move them across policy boundaries
- An attacker may delete files that should be inaccessible
- Confidential data could be exposed or integrity of stored content could be affected
- Rule-based tenant or directory isolation could be weakened
General mitigation guidance
Mitigation generally focuses on enforcing authorization at the resource level
for every object affected by a bulk operation.
Common defensive patterns include:
- Revalidating access rules for each source and destination descendant
- Treating recursive operations as a set of individual authorization decisions
- Denying an operation when any affected object fails policy evaluation
- Canonicalizing paths before authorization checks and preventing boundary confusion
- Applying least-privilege permissions to users and service accounts
- Using secure-by-default policies that do not infer descendant access solely from parent access
- Logging authorization decisions and rejected descendant operations
How teams detect issues like this
Organizations can identify similar issues through:
- Static analysis and code review checks for recursive filesystem operations lacking per-object authorization
- Tests that place denied files beneath allowed directories and exercise copy, rename, and delete workflows
- Policy tests covering path canonicalization, parent-child rule inheritance, and cross-boundary destinations
- Runtime monitoring for bulk operations affecting objects outside the initiating user's allowed scope
- Automated review tools that flag authorization checks performed only before recursive traversal

