Summary
Budibase exposed a tenant user lookup endpoint as publicly accessible and returned complete platform user records. An unauthenticated caller could use email addresses or user identifiers to identify existing users and obtain tenant IDs, user IDs, email addresses, SSO identifiers, and document revision metadata.
Affected context
The issue affects Budibase deployments using versions before 3.39.32, where the tenant user lookup route was included in the public endpoint list. The lookup operation returned a full PlatformUser document rather than limiting the response to the minimum data required for the request.
Exploit preconditions
- Attack surface: Public HTTP API endpoint for tenant user lookup
- Required access: No authentication is required
- Trigger point: A request to the tenant user lookup route using an email address or user identifier
- Why exploitation is possible: The route was treated as public and returned detailed user records, allowing callers to distinguish existing users from missing users and inspect associated metadata
Why this happens
The underlying flaw was excessive exposure of a user lookup function through an unauthenticated API route. The endpoint both lacked an appropriate authorization boundary and returned an entire PlatformUser document, including fields that were not necessary for basic lookup behavior. This maps to CWE-200: Exposure of Sensitive Information to an Unauthorized Actor.
Potential impact
- Attackers may enumerate valid users and email addresses
- Tenant and user identifiers could be exposed
- SSO identifiers and document revision metadata may be disclosed
- Exposed information could support phishing, account targeting, or correlation across tenants
- Repeated queries could enable broad user-directory harvesting
General mitigation guidance
Mitigation generally focuses on enforcing authentication and authorization for user lookup operations and minimizing returned data.
Common defensive patterns include:
- Removing unnecessary lookup routes from public endpoint allowlists
- Requiring authenticated, tenant-scoped authorization for identity queries
- Returning only the minimum fields needed for the stated function
- Avoiding responses that reveal whether a queried account exists when that distinction is not required
- Applying rate limits, abuse monitoring, and consistent error responses
- Treating identifiers, SSO attributes, and revision metadata as protected data
How teams detect issues like this
Organizations can detect similar issues through:
- Static analysis and route-policy checks for endpoints placed in public or unauthenticated allowlists
- Code review of handlers that return complete database or platform documents
- API contract tests verifying authentication, tenant scoping, and response-field minimization
- Monitoring for high-volume identity lookup requests and sequential or broad identifier probing
- Policy enforcement that requires explicit authorization and data-classification review for user-directory APIs

