Summary
Prowler contains a server-side request forgery vulnerability in the Lighthouse OpenAI-compatible provider configuration. An authenticated user with provider configuration access may cause the service to send requests, including the configured API key, to attacker-controlled or internal endpoints when listing models.
Affected context
The issue occurs in Prowler deployments where Lighthouse providers can be created or updated through the API and the openai_compatible provider accepts a user-controlled base_url. Risk is greater when the Prowler service can reach internal network services or when the configured provider credential is included in outbound authorization headers.
Exploit preconditions
- Attack surface: Lighthouse provider configuration API endpoints
- Required access: Authenticated access with permission to configure Lighthouse providers
- Trigger point: Model listing through the configured OpenAI-compatible provider
- Why exploitation is possible: The supplied
base_urlis not sufficiently validated before the backend sends an outbound request and forwards the provider API key
Why this happens
The vulnerability results from accepting a provider endpoint from an authenticated user without applying adequate URL validation, destination restrictions, or trust-boundary enforcement. The backend then uses that endpoint for server-side network communication and attaches a sensitive authorization header, mapping to CWE-918: Server-Side Request Forgery. This insecure pattern allows application-controlled requests to reach destinations that should not be selectable by configuration input.
Potential impact
- Requests to attacker-controlled systems may expose the configured API key
- Internal services may receive requests originating from the Prowler server
- Cloud metadata or administrative endpoints could be probed where network access permits
- Internal service information may be disclosed through response handling or operational logs
- Downstream systems may be affected if requests are accepted as trusted
General mitigation guidance
Mitigation generally focuses on reducing trust in user-supplied provider URLs and restricting outbound network access.
Common defensive patterns include:
- Allowlisting approved provider schemes, hosts, ports, and deployment-specific destinations
- Resolving and validating destinations before connection, including protections against DNS rebinding and private-network targets
- Avoiding automatic forwarding of API keys to destinations that are not explicitly trusted
- Separating connection testing from privileged provider operations and minimizing returned response data
- Applying egress filtering, network segmentation, and least-privilege service connectivity
- Keeping provider credentials narrowly scoped and preventing their exposure in logs or error messages
How teams detect issues like this
Organizations can look for SSRF risks through:
- Static analysis rules identifying user-controlled URLs passed to HTTP clients
- Code review checks for missing scheme, host, port, redirect, and private-address validation
- Review of code paths that attach credentials to requests based on configurable endpoints
- API policy enforcement restricting provider URLs to approved destinations
- Network telemetry monitoring unexpected connections from Prowler to internal, metadata, or unusual external hosts
- Audit logging of provider configuration changes and outbound connection targets
Automated security review tools may help identify URL-to-request flows and credential forwarding patterns.

