Severity:

HIGH RISK

(7.3)

Command Injection in aider-mcp code_with_ai Component

CVE-2026-7316

Deferred

Vulnerability type

Category:

Command Injection

CWE:

CWE-74, CWE-77

Impact:

Remote Code Execution

Severity:

HIGH RISK

(7.3)

CVSS version:

3.1

Catch this CVE while code is being written

Detect vulnerable code directly in pull requests, so CVEs are fixed before merge.

Summary

A command injection vulnerability in the aider-mcp project's code_with_ai component allows user-controlled values in the working_dir and editable_files arguments to be incorporated into system commands without proper validation or escaping.

When attackers can influence these parameters remotely, they may execute arbitrary commands on the host running aider-mcp, leading to high-impact compromise of the underlying environment.

Affected context

The issue occurs in the aider_mcp.py file within the code_with_ai component of the aider-mcp project.

It manifests when user-supplied or externally influenced values for working_dir and/or editable_files are passed into command execution logic (such as shell calls, subprocess invocations, or similar mechanisms) without strict validation, canonicalization, or safe argument handling.

Deployments that expose this functionality over a network interface, API, or bot-like integration, where untrusted users can control these parameters, are particularly at risk.

Exploit preconditions

  • Attack surface: Remote, via interfaces that accept or derive working_dir and editable_files values (e.g., HTTP API, chat interface, or remote client).
  • Required access: Ability to submit or influence these arguments in requests or workflow configurations consumed by code_with_ai.
  • Trigger point: Invocation of the vulnerable function in aider_mcp.py that constructs and executes a command incorporating working_dir / editable_files.
  • Why exploitation is possible: Input values are treated as trusted and are interpolated into command lines or shell contexts without sanitization, quoting, or use of safe, argument-based APIs, enabling attackers to inject additional commands or modify execution semantics.

Why this happens

The root cause aligns with CWE-77: Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in a Command ('Command Injection'), and is closely related to CWE-74: Improper Neutralization of Special Elements in Output Used by a Downstream Component.

The vulnerable code likely builds command strings that include working_dir and editable_files and executes them via a shell, or passes them to a downstream tool that interprets them as commands.

Because the code does not properly neutralize shell metacharacters, separators, or other control characters, attackers can craft input values that break out of the intended command structure, injecting arbitrary commands.

Abstractly, this reflects the insecure pattern of treating untrusted text as part of executable command lines, rather than as data or arguments, and failing to enforce strict allowlists or safe APIs for command execution.

Potential impact

  • Execution of arbitrary system commands under the privileges of the aider-mcp process
  • Reading, modifying, or deleting source code files and project assets
  • Exfiltration of environment variables, credentials, or API keys accessible to the process
  • Lateral movement within the host or container environment, potentially compromising additional services
  • Service disruption, denial of service, or corruption of application state
  • Planting of backdoors or malicious modifications in code bases managed via aider-mcp

General mitigation guidance

Effective mitigation focuses on treating working_dir, editable_files, and similar inputs as untrusted data and never as direct command fragments.

Pattern-based mitigation strategies include:

  • Avoid shell command construction: Prefer APIs that accept argument lists (e.g., subprocess with shell=False) or library calls that implement the desired functionality without invoking a shell.
  • Strict input validation: Constrain working_dir to known-safe directory paths (e.g., project root or subdirectories) and editable_files to a validated list of file names or patterns; reject or normalize unexpected characters like ;, &, |, backticks, newlines, and redirection operators.
  • Canonicalization and allowlists: Resolve paths to canonical forms and ensure they remain within allowed directories; use allowlists for acceptable file extensions or names.
  • Least privilege execution: Run aider-mcp with minimal OS privileges and limited filesystem access so that, even if a command is abused, its blast radius is reduced.
  • Separation of duties: Isolate any functionality that must touch system tools or shells into tightly controlled modules with constrained inputs and clear security boundaries.
  • Secure defaults: Configure interfaces so that remote users cannot arbitrarily define working_dir or arbitrary file paths unless explicitly trusted.

How teams detect issues like this

Detection can combine code-centric analysis with runtime monitoring:

  • Static analysis: Use tooling or custom rules to flag:
  • String concatenation or formatting used to build shell commands with untrusted data.
  • Calls to APIs like os.system, subprocess.Popen, or equivalent wrappers where shell=True or where user-controlled input is present in the command.
  • Code review cues: During manual review, look for code paths in aider_mcp.py where working_dir and editable_files are:
  • Derived from external inputs (API parameters, user messages).
  • Used in command construction without explicit validation, allowlists, or escaping.
  • Configuration and policy checks: Enforce policies (e.g., via linters or CI checks) that prohibit shell-based execution with unsanitized input and require safe process-spawning patterns.
  • Runtime monitoring: Observe process activity for unexpected commands, unusual child processes spawned by aider-mcp, or anomalous file access patterns, which may indicate active exploitation.

Sources

SourceLink
github.comgithub.com/eiliyaabedini/aider-mcp/
github.comgithub.com/eiliyaabedini/aider-mcp/issues/1
vuldb.comvuldb.com/submit/803082
vuldb.comvuldb.com/vuln/359964
vuldb.comvuldb.com/vuln/359964/cti

Frequently asked

questions

Exploitability depends on how aider-mcp and its code_with_ai component are exposed. If remote users or automated agents can supply working_dir or editable_files values without strong access controls, the vulnerability can be exploited remotely with relatively low effort. In more restricted, local-only setups, exploitation is limited to users who can interact with the affected interface.

An attacker generally needs the ability to influence the parameters processed by the vulnerable function—typically via a network-facing API, chat integration, or other interface that routes user input into working_dir / editable_files. No local shell access is required if the application is exposed over the network.

The safest pattern is to avoid constructing shell commands with user data altogether. Use high-level library calls or command-execution APIs that accept argument lists rather than shell strings, set shell=False where applicable, and strictly validate or constrain any file paths or directories to a known-safe subset.

Prevention relies on a combination of secure coding practices and process controls: train developers to treat all external input as untrusted, adopt coding standards that prohibit shell-based command building with user data, apply static analysis and CI checks that detect command injection patterns, and regularly review code paths where external input influences command execution or filesystem operations.

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