Summary
A path traversal vulnerability in the get_doc_path function of eiceblue spire-doc-mcp-server 1.0.0 allows remote attackers to manipulate the document_name parameter to access unintended files on the server.
When user-controlled document names are not properly validated or normalized, crafted input can escape the intended document directory and potentially expose sensitive data or other application resources.
Affected context
The issue occurs in deployments of spire-doc-mcp-server 1.0.0 that accept a document_name value from clients and pass it into get_doc_path to resolve a file on disk.
The vulnerability is present when:
- The application constructs filesystem paths from user input
- The server has access to directories or files beyond the intended document storage root
- There is no robust canonicalization or restriction of the resolved path back to an expected base directory
Exploit preconditions
- Attack surface: Network-exposed API endpoints that call
get_doc_pathwith adocument_nameparameter. - Required access: Ability to send crafted HTTP or protocol-level requests to the spire-doc-mcp-server instance; no local filesystem access is required.
- Trigger point: Supplying a specially formed
document_namevalue (for example, using traversal sequences) that the server uses directly to compute a filesystem path. - Why exploitation is possible: User-controlled path components are concatenated or joined with a base directory without sufficient normalization, validation, or enforcement that the final resolved path remains within an allowed directory scope.
Why this happens
This vulnerability stems from constructing filesystem paths directly from untrusted input and failing to enforce directory constraints on the resolved path.
In abstract terms, this matches CWE-22: Improper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory, where input that should reference only files within a designated folder is accepted without validating or canonicalizing it against that folder.
The code likely joins a base directory with document_name (or similar) and relies on the filesystem to interpret the result, allowing traversal sequences or absolute paths to escape the intended document directory.
Potential impact
- Access to files outside the intended document directory that the server process can read
- Disclosure of application configuration files, logs, or system information
- Exposure of credentials, keys, or other sensitive data stored on the server
- Use of local file contents to aid in further attacks against the application or host
General mitigation guidance
Effective mitigation focuses on constraining how user input influences filesystem paths and strictly defining allowed locations:
- Normalize and canonicalize any constructed path and verify it resides under a pre-defined base directory before use (e.g., compare canonical paths).
- Maintain an allowlist of valid document identifiers or filenames and map them to server-side paths, rather than accepting arbitrary path fragments from clients.
- Avoid exposing raw filesystem structure through API parameters; instead use opaque IDs or references.
- Run the server process with least-privilege filesystem permissions so that even if traversal is attempted, access to sensitive areas is limited.
- Centralize path-handling utility functions that enforce these checks consistently across all file access points.
How teams detect issues like this
Detection typically combines code-level review with runtime monitoring:
- Static analysis: Flag direct use of user-controlled variables in file operations (
open,os.path.join, path libraries) without preceding validation or base-directory checks. - Code review cues: Look for APIs that accept filenames or paths and construct paths by string concatenation or simple joins; verify they enforce a fixed root directory and canonicalization.
- Security tests: Incorporate automated tests or DAST scans that attempt directory traversal patterns (
../, URL-encoded traversal) against endpoints that return or process files. - Logging and monitoring: Instrument file access routines to log when requested paths resolve outside the expected document root; alert on such events for investigation.

