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CVE-2026-72872

Severity:

CRITICAL RISK

(9.9)

Command Injection (CWE-78) in Dokploy Bitbucket Provider

CVE-2026-72872

Received

Vulnerability type

Category:

OS Command Injection

CWE:

CWE-78

Impact:

Arbitrary Operating System Command Execution

Severity:

CRITICAL RISK

(9.9)

CVSS version:

3.1

Catch this CVE while code is being written

Detect vulnerable code directly in pull requests, so CVEs are fixed before merge.

Summary

A critical OS command injection vulnerability in Dokploy allows unvalidated Bitbucket owner and repository values to become part of Git clone commands.

A member with service deployment permission may be able to execute arbitrary operating system commands on the Dokploy host or a configured target server when Bitbucket repository cloning is triggered.

Affected context

The vulnerability occurs in Dokploy deployments that use the Bitbucket provider to clone repositories and accept repository owner or name values through the application configuration workflow. It becomes risky when a user with service deployment permission can influence those values and the resulting command is executed through a local or remote shell without adequate argument isolation.

Exploit preconditions

  • Attack surface: Dokploy Bitbucket provider and repository deployment workflow
  • Required access: A member account with permission to deploy services or otherwise influence Bitbucket deployment settings
  • Trigger point: Cloning a Bitbucket repository during application deployment
  • Why exploitation is possible: Unvalidated owner and repository values are interpolated into shell commands executed through local or remote command helpers

Why this happens

The underlying bug is command construction from attacker-influenced input. The application stores Bitbucket owner and repository fields without sufficient validation, then embeds those values into a command string passed to shell-execution functions.

This behavior maps to CWE-78: Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an OS Command. The insecure pattern is treating repository metadata as trusted command syntax instead of separating data from executable arguments and enforcing an appropriate input model.

Potential impact

  • An attacker may execute arbitrary operating system commands on the Dokploy host.
  • An attacker could execute commands on a configured target server through remote deployment operations.
  • Application credentials, environment variables, deployment secrets, or source code may be exposed.
  • The affected host or target server could be modified, disrupted, or used for lateral movement.
  • Deployments and hosted applications could be tampered with or rendered unavailable.

General mitigation guidance

Mitigation generally focuses on eliminating shell interpretation of repository metadata and reducing the trust placed in deployment inputs.

Common defensive patterns include:

  • Use a process execution API that passes commands and arguments as separate values without invoking a shell.
  • Apply allowlisted validation for repository owners, repository names, and provider-specific identifiers.
  • Avoid building command strings through interpolation or concatenation.
  • Restrict deployment permissions according to least privilege and separate repository configuration from command execution authority.
  • Limit credentials, filesystem access, and network permissions available to deployment workers and target servers.
  • Treat locally supplied and remotely retrieved repository metadata as untrusted input.

How teams detect issues like this

Organizations can look for:

  • Static analysis findings involving shell execution APIs, command-string interpolation, and concatenation of request or configuration values.
  • Code review signals where repository, branch, owner, or URL fields flow into local or remote command runners.
  • Runtime monitoring for unusual Git clone arguments, shell metacharacters, unexpected child processes, or deployment commands outside normal workflows.
  • Policy checks requiring argument-array process execution and approved validation routines for deployment integrations.

Automated security review tools can help identify data flows from deployment inputs into command execution functions.

Sources

SourceLink
github.comgithub.com/Dokploy/dokploy/commit/47347ab885b0ad1f5d0ef0e5e74bbba35c7f93bc
github.comgithub.com/Dokploy/dokploy/pull/4855
github.comgithub.com/Dokploy/dokploy/releases/tag/v0.29.13
github.comgithub.com/Dokploy/dokploy/security/advisories/GHSA-grrj-6xrh-j6vp

Frequently asked

questions

It may be exploitable through Dokploy's authenticated deployment interface when the attacker can influence Bitbucket provider values. The exact reach depends on deployment exposure, authorization controls, and whether cloning occurs locally or on a target server.

The described attack requires membership with service deployment permission or equivalent ability to control relevant application or provider settings.

Avoid shell-interpreted command strings, pass repository values as isolated process arguments, and enforce strict allowlist validation before execution.

Treat all deployment metadata as untrusted, apply least-privilege permissions, review input-to-command data flows, and enforce secure process-execution policies in development and CI workflows.

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