Summary
File Browser fails to enforce per-user directory isolation in proxy and hook authentication auto-provisioning paths. An attacker with valid upstream-authenticated credentials may access, modify, delete, or share files belonging to other users when the server root scope is assigned incorrectly.
Affected context
The vulnerability occurs in File Browser deployments using proxy or hook authentication with automatic user provisioning. It becomes risky when the createUserDir isolation setting is not honored and authenticated users are assigned a broader server root scope than intended.
Exploit preconditions
- Attack surface: File Browser file-management endpoints used after authentication
- Required access: Valid credentials accepted through an upstream proxy or authentication hook
- Trigger point: Automatic user provisioning and assignment of the user's server root directory
- Why exploitation is possible: The authentication path can assign a shared or overly broad root scope instead of enforcing the user's isolated directory
Why this happens
The underlying flaw is an authorization-boundary failure in authentication-driven account provisioning. File Browser does not consistently apply the createUserDir isolation policy when users are created through proxy or hook authentication paths, allowing authenticated identities to receive access beyond their intended directory. This maps to CWE-284: Improper Access Control, because authorization checks do not reliably constrain file operations to the requesting user's permitted scope.
Potential impact
- Users may read files owned by other accounts
- Attackers may modify or delete data outside their authorized directory
- Sensitive files may be shared with unauthorized recipients
- User data confidentiality and integrity could be compromised
- The issue may enable broader abuse of shared server storage
General mitigation guidance
Mitigation generally focuses on enforcing authorization at every file-operation boundary and maintaining a strict separation between authentication and resource authorization.
Common defensive patterns include:
- Apply per-user directory isolation consistently across all authentication and provisioning paths
- Derive file scopes from centrally enforced authorization policies rather than user-controlled or loosely trusted settings
- Use deny-by-default access rules for file listing, sharing, modification, and deletion
- Limit service and storage permissions according to least privilege
- Review existing user roots and revoke unintended cross-user access
- Add regression tests covering proxy and hook authentication provisioning behavior
How teams detect issues like this
Organizations can look for this class of issue through:
- Static and behavioral analysis of account-provisioning code for inconsistent scope assignment
- Code review signals such as authentication paths that bypass shared authorization helpers
- Tests verifying that users cannot enumerate, access, modify, delete, or share files outside their assigned root
- Audit-log monitoring for cross-user file access, unexpected sharing, and unusual deletion or modification activity
- Policy checks requiring deny-by-default resource authorization and centralized permission enforcement

