Summary
A server-side request forgery vulnerability in Next AI Draw.io allows unauthenticated users to make the application request URLs on their behalf. Because hostname checks rely on string patterns without resolving destinations, crafted hostnames may reach internal services and expose sensitive responses such as cloud metadata.
Affected context
The issue occurs in deployments where the POST /api/parse-url endpoint accepts user-controlled URLs and attempts to restrict internal destinations through hostname string validation alone. It becomes risky when the application can make outbound HTTP requests from a network position that can reach private services, link-local addresses, or cloud metadata endpoints.
Exploit preconditions
- Attack surface: The unauthenticated POST
/api/parse-urlendpoint - Required access: Ability to submit requests to the endpoint; authentication may not be required
- Trigger point: Server-side URL parsing or retrieval performed after accepting attacker-controlled input
- Why exploitation is possible: Hostname pattern checks do not reliably establish the final network destination, allowing names that pass validation to resolve to internal addresses
Why this happens
The vulnerability results from treating hostname string patterns as sufficient proof that a destination is external. DNS resolution can produce an address different from what superficial validation suggests, including private, loopback, link-local, or cloud-provider metadata ranges. This maps to CWE-918: Server-Side Request Forgery, where a server is induced to send requests to attacker-selected or otherwise restricted destinations.
Potential impact
- Internal HTTP services may be accessed without their usual network controls
- Cloud instance metadata or temporary credentials could be exposed
- Sensitive response contents may be returned to an external requester
- Internal service APIs could be probed or abused
- The application may be used as a pivot point for further attacks
General mitigation guidance
Mitigation generally focuses on reducing trust in user-provided URLs and enforcing destination policy at the network boundary.
Common defensive patterns include:
- Prefer an allowlist of approved schemes, hosts, ports, and destinations over denylist-based hostname checks
- Resolve hostnames and validate every resulting address before connecting
- Re-check destination addresses across redirects and connection steps
- Block loopback, private, link-local, multicast, and metadata address ranges
- Restrict outbound connectivity from the application with network controls
- Avoid returning fetched response bodies when they are not required
- Run the URL-fetching component with minimal network and runtime privileges
How teams detect issues like this
Organizations commonly detect SSRF risks through:
- Static analysis rules for server-side HTTP clients using user-controlled URLs
- Code review checks for hostname-only validation, unrestricted redirects, and missing IP-range checks
- Dynamic testing with controlled external endpoints and simulated private-address resolution
- Egress policy monitoring for unexpected connections to internal, loopback, link-local, or metadata destinations
- Security policies requiring URL allowlists and explicit outbound network authorization
Automated code review and application security testing tools can help identify these patterns early.

