Summary
AVideo fails to sanitize the phone field during user registration, allowing unauthenticated attackers to store JavaScript in the database. When an administrator views the user management page, the stored value may execute in the administrator's browser session.
Affected context
The vulnerability occurs in AVideo user registration and user management workflows when the phone field accepts attacker-controlled content, stores it without adequate output encoding or sanitization, and later renders it through innerHTML. Risk depends on an administrator viewing the affected user record in a browser context where the stored value is interpreted as HTML or script.
Exploit preconditions
- Attack surface: User registration and administrator-facing user management pages
- Required access: No authentication may be required to submit the registration data
- Trigger point: An administrator views a page containing the stored phone value
- Why exploitation is possible: Attacker-controlled data is persisted and later inserted into the page without context-appropriate output encoding
Why this happens
The underlying bug is a failure to treat registration fields as untrusted data throughout their lifecycle. The phone value is stored without sufficient validation or sanitization and is later rendered through an HTML insertion API, causing data to be interpreted as executable markup rather than displayed as text. This behavior maps to CWE-79: Improper Neutralization of Input During Web Page Generation, commonly known as cross-site scripting.
Potential impact
- An attacker may execute script in an administrator's browser session
- Session information or other accessible page data could be exposed
- Administrative actions could be performed through the affected session
- Users may be redirected, deceived, or exposed to malicious content
- The application could experience integrity or reputational harm
General mitigation guidance
Mitigation generally focuses on preserving the phone field as data and preventing it from crossing into an executable HTML context.
Common defensive patterns include:
- Apply strict server-side validation appropriate for phone numbers
- Encode untrusted values for the specific output context before rendering
- Prefer safe text-rendering APIs such as
textContentoverinnerHTMLfor user data - Sanitize any intentionally permitted markup using a narrowly configured allowlist
- Enforce consistent input handling on both registration and administrative display paths
- Use restrictive Content Security Policy controls as defense in depth
- Limit administrative privileges and session scope to reduce potential impact
How teams detect issues like this
Organizations can look for this class of issue through:
- Static analysis rules identifying untrusted values passed to
innerHTMLor equivalent DOM sinks - Code review checks tracing registration fields from persistence to administrative pages
- Dynamic testing that submits harmless markup markers and verifies they are displayed as text
- Security policies requiring contextual output encoding for all user-controlled values
- Monitoring for unusual registration data and unexpected script-like content in profile fields
Automated application security testing and code review tools may help identify unsafe source-to-sink flows.

