Summary
An improper authorization vulnerability in Attendize allows an authenticated remote attacker to add persistent mandatory survey questions to events belonging to another organizer. The issue becomes risky when the event question creation endpoint accepts a target event without enforcing tenant or organizer ownership.
Affected context
The vulnerability occurs in Attendize event-management functionality when the question creation endpoint loads an event without applying the tenant-isolation scope. Deployments are exposed when authenticated users can submit requests referencing events outside their authorized organizer context, while deletion remains constrained by the victim's account scope.
Exploit preconditions
- Attack surface: Authenticated remote HTTP request to the event question creation endpoint
- Required access: A valid authenticated Attendize account with access to submit event-question requests
- Trigger point:
POST /event/{event_id}/question/create - Why exploitation is possible: The target event is resolved without tenant-isolation checks, allowing a request to create a question under another organizer's event
- Persistence condition: The injected question may remain inaccessible to the victim's account-scoped deletion path
Why this happens
The underlying bug is an authorization failure caused by resolving a tenant-owned event outside the access-control scope used elsewhere in the application. The creation operation trusts a user-supplied event identifier without consistently verifying that the authenticated user owns or is authorized to modify the referenced event. This maps to CWE-639: Authorization Bypass Through User-Controlled Key, where a user-controlled identifier permits access to another tenant's resource.
Potential impact
- An attacker could modify another organizer's event configuration
- Victims may be unable to remove the injected mandatory survey question through normal account-scoped controls
- Event attendees could be required to answer attacker-controlled questions
- Cross-tenant integrity and trust boundaries could be weakened
- The issue may support abuse of event workflows or reputational harm
General mitigation guidance
Mitigation generally centers on enforcing authorization at the resource-resolution and mutation layers.
Common defensive patterns include:
- Resolve target events through the authenticated user's tenant or organizer scope
- Apply the same authorization policy consistently to create, update, and delete operations
- Treat event identifiers as references requiring server-side ownership verification rather than proof of access
- Use centralized policy checks and deny-by-default authorization for cross-tenant resources
- Enforce least privilege for organizer and administrative roles
- Return consistent authorization failures without revealing whether unrelated resources exist
How teams detect issues like this
Organizations can look for:
- Static analysis or code review findings where user-controlled identifiers are queried without tenant predicates
- Controller and service methods that load resources globally before invoking authorization checks
- Missing authorization tests for cross-tenant create, update, and delete operations
- Audit events showing authenticated users creating questions on events outside their organizer scope
- Policy enforcement rules requiring tenant context on all resource mutation queries
Automated application-security review tools may help identify inconsistent resource scoping, but runtime authorization tests remain important.

