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CVE-2026-72561

Severity:

HIGH RISK

(8.8)

Broken Access Control (CWE-284) in Peppermint OIDC

CVE-2026-72561

Deferred

Vulnerability type

Category:

Broken Access Control

CWE:

CWE-284

Impact:

Unauthorized global SSO reconfiguration and potential credential harvesting

Severity:

HIGH RISK

(8.8)

CVSS version:

3.1

Catch this CVE while code is being written

Detect vulnerable code directly in pull requests, so CVEs are fixed before merge.

Summary

A broken access control vulnerability in Peppermint allows any authenticated non-administrative user to change global OIDC/SSO settings through an endpoint that lacks an administrative authorization check.

A user who can reach this endpoint may redirect SSO authentication to an attacker-controlled identity provider, potentially enabling credential harvesting from other platform users.

Affected context

The issue occurs in Peppermint deployments that expose the global OIDC/SSO configuration endpoint to authenticated users without enforcing an administrative role requirement. The risk is present when non-administrative accounts can submit issuer configuration changes that affect authentication for the broader platform.

Exploit preconditions

  • Attack surface: The platform's global OIDC/SSO configuration endpoint
  • Required access: An authenticated Peppermint account; administrative privileges should not be necessary
  • Trigger point: Submission of new OIDC issuer settings through the configuration endpoint
  • Why exploitation is possible: The endpoint applies global authentication changes without first verifying that the requester has an administrative role

Why this happens

The underlying flaw is an authorization failure in a sensitive configuration operation. The endpoint relies on authentication alone rather than enforcing a server-side administrative permission check before changing global identity-provider settings.

This maps to CWE-284: Improper Access Control, because the application does not adequately restrict a privileged action to authorized administrative users. As a result, a lower-privileged authenticated principal can modify security-sensitive configuration that affects other users.

Potential impact

  • An attacker may redirect platform SSO flows to an unauthorized identity provider
  • Users could be exposed to credential-harvesting pages
  • Authentication integrity may be undermined across the platform
  • The attacker could gain access to accounts if users submit credentials to a fraudulent provider
  • Organizations may experience account compromise, data exposure, or service disruption

General mitigation guidance

Mitigation typically focuses on enforcing authorization at the server-side boundary for every security-sensitive configuration operation.

Common defensive patterns include:

  • Require an explicit administrative permission for global OIDC and SSO changes
  • Deny access by default and validate the effective role or capability on each request
  • Separate global identity-provider configuration from ordinary user settings
  • Require reauthentication or step-up approval for changes affecting authentication
  • Validate issuer values against an approved policy or controlled allowlist
  • Record configuration changes with actor, timestamp, previous value, and resulting value
  • Run the platform with least privilege and limit who can manage authentication configuration

How teams detect issues like this

Organizations commonly detect this class of issue through:

  • Static analysis and route reviews that identify sensitive endpoints lacking authorization middleware
  • Code review checks for role or capability validation before global configuration writes
  • Integration tests that attempt privileged operations using ordinary authenticated accounts
  • Policy enforcement requiring administrative authorization for identity-provider changes
  • Audit monitoring for unexpected OIDC issuer updates, especially those involving unapproved domains
  • Automated application security testing that exercises endpoints under multiple user roles

Sources

SourceLink
github.comgithub.com/Peppermint-Lab/peppermint

Frequently asked

questions

Yes, where the affected configuration endpoint is reachable through the Peppermint application and the attacker has a valid authenticated account. Exploitability also depends on deployment exposure and any additional controls around the endpoint.

No. The described issue allows an authenticated non-administrative user to perform an operation intended to be restricted to administrators.

Enforce a server-side administrative authorization check before applying any global OIDC or SSO configuration change. Authorization should be evaluated for every request rather than inferred from the client interface.

Maintain role-based access-control tests for sensitive routes, use deny-by-default policies, require approval or reauthentication for authentication changes, and monitor all identity-provider configuration updates.

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