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CVE-2026-72556

Severity:

HIGH RISK

(8.8)

OS Command Injection (CWE-78) in ZoneMinder Filters

CVE-2026-72556

Deferred

Vulnerability type

Category:

OS Command Injection

CWE:

CWE-78

Impact:

Remote Code Execution

Severity:

HIGH RISK

(8.8)

CVSS version:

3.1

Catch this CVE while code is being written

Detect vulnerable code directly in pull requests, so CVEs are fixed before merge.

Summary

ZoneMinder 1.39.17 contains a broken permission check in its Filter class that can allow any authenticated user to execute operating system commands. The issue becomes risky when filter functionality is available to users whose roles should not permit command execution.

Affected context

The vulnerability occurs in ZoneMinder deployments using the affected Filter functionality and relying on role-based checks to restrict filter actions. It is relevant when an authenticated account can reach filter operations, while the application's permission methods incorrectly treat unavailable user methods as successful authorization results.

Exploit preconditions

  • Attack surface: ZoneMinder filter management and processing functionality
  • Required access: A valid authenticated user account
  • Trigger point: Filter operations that invoke the affected permission checks and command-execution behavior
  • Why exploitation is possible: canEdit() and canDelete() call nonexistent methods on ZM\User; PHP __call() returns a truthy result, causing authorization checks to succeed for users without the intended role

Why this happens

The vulnerability is an OS command injection issue mapped to CWE-78. Authorization logic in the Filter class depends on method calls that do not exist on the user object, and PHP's __call() behavior produces a truthy result instead of a denied authorization decision. This broken permission validation allows untrusted authenticated users to reach functionality capable of passing attacker-influenced values to operating system command execution.

Potential impact

  • An authenticated user may execute arbitrary operating system commands
  • The ZoneMinder service account may be compromised
  • Attackers could access, alter, or delete locally available data
  • The host may be used for further lateral movement
  • Monitoring operations and recorded security data could be disrupted or manipulated

General mitigation guidance

Mitigation typically focuses on correcting authorization logic and eliminating command execution paths that accept user-controlled input.

Common defensive patterns include:

  • Use explicit, existing authorization methods that return deny-by-default results
  • Enforce server-side role and capability checks before every filter operation
  • Prefer structured APIs and fixed command mappings over shell command construction
  • Validate and constrain all values that can influence operating system interactions
  • Run the service with the minimum filesystem, process, and network privileges required
  • Restrict authenticated account creation and administrative permissions
  • Apply centralized authorization policies consistently across related operations

How teams detect issues like this

Organizations commonly detect this class of issue through:

  • Static analysis for calls to undefined methods in authorization-sensitive code
  • Rules identifying shell execution APIs that receive request, filter, or configuration data
  • Code review checks for permission methods that do not fail closed
  • Tests covering every user role against edit, delete, and execution-related filter actions
  • Runtime monitoring for unexpected child processes launched by the ZoneMinder service
  • Audit logging and policy enforcement for command execution and privileged filter changes

Automated code review and application security testing tools may help identify these patterns before deployment.

Sources

SourceLink
github.comgithub.com/ZoneMinder/zoneminder

Frequently asked

questions

It can be reached through the ZoneMinder application by an authenticated user, provided the affected filter functionality is accessible and the deployment exposes the relevant interface.

No. The reported permission flaw can cause users with lower-privileged roles to pass checks that should restrict filter operations. A valid authenticated account remains a prerequisite.

Ensure every permission check calls a defined authorization method, fails closed when authorization cannot be established, and prevents untrusted values from reaching shell command execution.

Use centralized deny-by-default authorization, test role boundaries, prefer non-shell APIs, validate command-related inputs, and monitor service processes for unexpected operating system activity.

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