Severity:

HIGH RISK

(7.3)

SQL Injection in Pizzafy Ecommerce System get_cart_count

CVE-2026-7228

Deferred

Vulnerability type

Category:

SQL Injection

CWE:

CWE-74, CWE-89

Impact:

Remote SQL Injection Leading to Data Exposure and Integrity Compromise

Severity:

HIGH RISK

(7.3)

CVSS version:

3.1

Catch this CVE while code is being written

Detect vulnerable code directly in pull requests, so CVEs are fixed before merge.

Summary

SourceCodester Pizzafy Ecommerce System 1.0 contains an SQL injection vulnerability in the get_cart_count functionality exposed via /admin/ajax.php?action=get_cart_count.

By manipulating the ID parameter, a remote attacker can inject arbitrary SQL queries into the backend database, potentially accessing or tampering with application data.

Affected context

The vulnerability occurs in the administrative AJAX endpoint /admin/ajax.php?action=get_cart_count, specifically in the get_cart_count function that processes the ID parameter.

It affects deployments where user-controlled input is passed directly into SQL queries without robust validation, context-aware escaping, or the use of parameterized statements.

Any instance of Pizzafy Ecommerce System 1.0 exposed to remote users, especially where this endpoint is reachable without strong access controls, may be at risk.

Exploit preconditions

  • Attack surface: HTTP(S) endpoint at /admin/ajax.php?action=get_cart_count.
  • Required access: Network-level access to the web application; impact may increase if the endpoint is accessible without strong authentication or is reachable by low-privileged users.
  • Trigger point: Supplying a crafted value for the ID parameter in a request to the vulnerable endpoint.
  • Why exploitation is possible: The ID parameter is incorporated into an SQL query without parameterization and with inadequate input validation or context-aware output encoding, allowing attacker-controlled fragments of SQL syntax to alter the intended query.

Why this happens

This issue stems from constructing SQL statements by directly concatenating untrusted input from the ID parameter into the query string, rather than using prepared statements with bound parameters.

The behavior maps to CWE-89: Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an SQL Command ('SQL Injection'), where metacharacters like quotes, comment markers, or operators are not safely handled.

The presence of CWE-74: Improper Neutralization of Special Elements in Output Used by a Downstream Component reflects that the SQL engine, as a downstream component, receives improperly sanitized data from the application layer.

Abstractly, the pattern is: user-controlled data → string concatenation into query → SQL engine executes modified query logic.

Potential impact

  • Attacker may read sensitive data from database tables, including customer or order information.
  • Attacker may modify or delete records, impacting inventory, cart contents, or transaction logs.
  • Attacker could create or escalate application-level accounts if authentication data is stored in the same database.
  • Attacker may perform union-based or error-based enumeration of database schema, aiding further attacks.
  • In certain configurations, attacker-controlled queries could be chained into wider compromise of the underlying host or other connected systems via stored procedures or database-level features.

General mitigation guidance

Effective mitigation focuses on eliminating dynamic query construction with untrusted data and tightening how input is handled:

  • Prefer parameterized queries / prepared statements for all database interactions, ensuring that user input is always bound as data, not executable SQL.
  • Implement strict input validation for identifiers like ID, limiting them to expected formats (e.g., positive integers) and rejecting anything outside the allowed pattern.
  • Apply least-privilege database accounts, so even if a query is abused, the account cannot access or modify unnecessary tables or perform dangerous operations.
  • Centralize database access in a data access layer with secure-by-default query helpers that discourage or forbid raw string concatenation.
  • Consider query whitelisting for simple lookups (only predefined query shapes with variable parameters, no dynamic fragments).
  • Use defense-in-depth controls such as Web Application Firewalls (WAFs) with SQL injection signatures to reduce exposure, while not treating them as a primary fix.

How teams detect issues like this

High-level strategies to detect this type of vulnerability include:

  • Static analysis: Configure rules to flag string concatenation or interpolation used in SQL query construction, especially around request parameters like $_GET['ID'] or $_POST['ID'].
  • Code review: During manual review, look for direct use of superglobals or raw request data in SQL calls, queries built with concatenation, and missing validation or casting for identifier-like inputs.
  • Dynamic testing: Employ automated scanners or manual penetration testing to send SQL metacharacters through the ID parameter and observe for errors, time delays, or content changes indicating injection.
  • Runtime monitoring: Analyze database query logs for anomalous patterns, such as appended OR 1=1, unexpected union queries, or unusually long statements originating from the vulnerable endpoint.
  • Policy enforcement: Introduce CI/CD checks that disallow introduction of new non-parameterized SQL calls, and require use of vetted database access utilities.

Sources

SourceLink
github.comgithub.com/fernando-mengali/vulndb-submissions/blob/main/05-vul-SQLI.md
vuldb.comvuldb.com/submit/802416
vuldb.comvuldb.com/vuln/359828
vuldb.comvuldb.com/vuln/359828/cti
sourcecodester.comsourcecodester.com/

Frequently asked

questions

The vulnerability is considered highly exploitable because the affected endpoint accepts user-supplied input and the exploit pattern has already been publicly disclosed. If the endpoint is reachable to remote users, attackers can often automate exploitation.

The attacker typically only needs network access to the web application and the ability to send HTTP requests to /admin/ajax.php?action=get_cart_count with a crafted ID parameter. Additional privileges may increase impact but are not strictly required for initial exploitation if the endpoint is weakly protected.

Refactor the get_cart_count logic (and similar database interactions) to use prepared statements with bound parameters and perform strict validation on the ID parameter (e.g., casting to integer). Avoid building SQL strings directly from any request data.

Adopt a consistent data access layer that enforces parameterized queries by default, define input validation rules for all externally influenced parameters, and integrate security-focused code review and static analysis into the development workflow to catch unsafe query patterns early.

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