Summary
SourceCodester Pizzafy Ecommerce System 1.0 contains an SQL injection vulnerability in the delete_cart functionality exposed via /admin/ajax.php?action=delete_cart, where the ID parameter is used unsafely in database queries.
A remote attacker can manipulate this parameter to inject arbitrary SQL, potentially accessing, modifying, or deleting backend data tied to shopping cart and administrative functions.
Affected context
The vulnerability occurs in the administrative AJAX endpoint /admin/ajax.php?action=delete_cart, specifically in the delete_cart function which processes the ID parameter to remove items from a cart.
It is present when user-controlled input (the ID argument) is concatenated directly into SQL statements without using prepared statements, parameter binding, or proper input validation.
Deployments that expose this endpoint over the network, especially where authentication or access controls are weak or misconfigured, are more susceptible to exploitation.
Exploit preconditions
- Attack surface: HTTP(S) interface to the Pizzafy Ecommerce System, targeting
/admin/ajax.php?action=delete_cart. - Required access: Ability to send crafted HTTP requests to the vulnerable endpoint; depending on configuration, this may require admin or backend access, or might be reachable without strong authentication.
- User-controlled parameter: The
IDargument is taken from the request and incorporated into SQL queries. - Trigger point: Execution of the
delete_cartfunction when processing a delete-cart operation. - Why exploitation is possible: The application dynamically builds SQL queries by interpolating the
IDvalue directly into the query string, without parameterization or robust validation, allowing injected SQL fragments to be executed by the database.
Why this happens
The core issue is the direct inclusion of user-controlled data into SQL statements, a classic case of CWE-89: Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an SQL Command ('SQL Injection').
Instead of using parameterized queries or prepared statements, the code likely constructs SQL using string concatenation or interpolation, trusting that the ID parameter is well-formed.
This pattern allows special SQL characters (such as quotes, operators, or comment markers) in the ID value to alter the structure and behavior of the SQL query, leading to unintended command execution on the database.
CWE-74 is relevant at a broader level because the application fails to neutralize special elements before embedding them into downstream interpreters.
Potential impact
- Attackers may read sensitive data from the database, including user or order information, beyond what they are authorized to access.
- Malicious queries could modify or delete cart entries and related transactional records, impacting data integrity.
- SQL injection may be used to escalate privileges by altering authentication or authorization data stored in the database.
- In certain database configurations, attackers could write or execute database-native functions, potentially leading to further compromise.
- Application behavior and availability may be disrupted through destructive or long-running injected queries.
General mitigation guidance
Effective mitigation focuses on removing the possibility of untrusted input influencing SQL structure and reducing the trust boundary of incoming parameters:
- Use parameterized queries / prepared statements for all database interactions, ensuring the
IDvalue is always treated as data, not executable SQL. - Enforce strict server-side validation and normalization for identifiers such as
ID(e.g., numeric type checks, allowed ranges) before passing values to the database layer. - Centralize data access through a database abstraction layer or ORM configured to use bound parameters by default, avoiding ad-hoc query string concatenation.
- Apply least-privilege principles to database accounts so that the application's DB user has only the minimal rights needed for cart operations.
- Introduce consistent input handling policies for all request parameters in administrative endpoints, treating them as untrusted regardless of perceived exposure.
How teams detect issues like this
Organizations can identify this class of issue using a combination of static and dynamic techniques:
- Static analysis: Configure SAST tools or custom rules to flag direct string concatenation of request parameters into SQL queries, especially within admin or AJAX handlers.
- Code review: During manual review, scrutinize database interactions in
ajax.phpand similar files for patterns like$sql = "DELETE ... WHERE id=$id";or unchecked interpolation of$_GET/$_POSTvalues. - Security testing: Use parameter tampering and fuzzing in DAST tools to detect anomalous responses to crafted
IDvalues that contain quotes, operators, or UNION-style payloads. - Policy enforcement: Adopt internal coding standards that require prepared statements, and enforce them through pre-commit hooks, CI checks, or linters integrated into the development workflow.
- Logging and monitoring: Monitor database logs and application error logs for suspicious query patterns or repeated errors related to malformed SQL statements.

