Severity:

HIGH RISK

(7.3)

Path Traversal in MLOps_MCP save_file Tool

CVE-2026-7213

Deferred

Vulnerability type

Category:

Path Traversal

CWE:

CWE-22

Impact:

Arbitrary File System Access (Read/Write) with Potential for Further Compromise

Severity:

HIGH RISK

(7.3)

CVSS version:

3.1

Catch this CVE while code is being written

Detect vulnerable code directly in pull requests, so CVEs are fixed before merge.

Summary

MLOps_MCP 1.0.0 contains a path traversal vulnerability in the save_file tool implemented in fastmcp_server.py, where user-controlled filename or destination parameters are not properly constrained to an expected directory.

A remote attacker can craft paths that escape the intended storage location and read from or write to arbitrary files on the server's filesystem, depending on how the tool is used, potentially leading to data exposure, tampering, or further compromise.

Affected context

The vulnerability appears in the save_file tool of fastmcp_server.py within MLOps_MCP 1.0.0.

It is relevant where:

  • The service exposes a remote interface (e.g., HTTP, RPC, or agent integration) allowing users or automated clients to request file saves.
  • The filename and/or destination arguments are influenced by remote input without strict validation, normalization, or directory constraints.
  • The server process has file system permissions beyond the intended upload directory (common in many default deployments).

In these conditions, the service can be tricked into reading from or writing to filesystem locations outside the designated upload path.

Exploit preconditions

  • Attack surface: Remote interface to the save_file tool (e.g., API endpoint, agent tool call, or service method).
  • Required access: Ability to invoke or indirectly trigger save_file with controllable filename and/or destination parameters. This may be authenticated or unauthenticated depending on deployment.
  • Trigger point: Any code path in fastmcp_server.py where path components derived from attacker input are concatenated or joined with server-side directories and then used in filesystem operations (open, write, overwrite, etc.).
  • Why exploitation is possible: User-controlled path segments are not canonicalized and restricted to an allowed base directory. Directory traversal sequences (such as ../) or absolute paths can escape the intended folder, enabling access to arbitrary locations within the permissions of the running process.

Why this happens

This issue is a classic instance of CWE-22: Improper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory.

The server-side file handling logic in fastmcp_server.py likely constructs filesystem paths by combining a presumed safe base directory with user-provided filename or destination strings without:

  • Normalizing the resulting path to a canonical form.
  • Verifying that the final path remains within an approved directory.
  • Rejecting dangerous patterns such as ../, absolute paths, or symlinks leading outside the target directory.

As a result, the application implicitly trusts client-supplied path components, allowing the file system to be used as an unintended capability surface for reading, writing, or overwriting files.

Potential impact

  • Reading sensitive files that are accessible to the MLOps_MCP server process (e.g., configuration files, environment-specific secrets, logs).
  • Overwriting or corrupting application files, configuration, or model artifacts stored on disk.
  • Injecting or modifying data used in MLOps workflows (e.g., training data, model files, pipeline artifacts), leading to data poisoning or model integrity issues.
  • Creating or modifying scripts or other executable content which, if later executed by the system or administrator, can enable code execution.
  • Disrupting MLOps pipelines or services by deleting or corrupting critical files required for operation.

General mitigation guidance

Robust mitigation relies on controlling where files can be written and treating path input as untrusted data:

  • Restrict file operations to a well-defined, application-owned directory and treat all file names as relative to that directory.
  • Normalize and canonicalize constructed paths, then verify that the resolved path starts with the expected base directory before performing any filesystem operation.
  • Reject any paths containing traversal patterns (such as .., drive specifiers, or leading slashes) or treat them as invalid user input.
  • Avoid using raw string concatenation for path construction; rely on platform-aware path APIs that are easier to validate.
  • Run the MLOps_MCP service under a dedicated, least-privileged account with minimal filesystem permissions, limiting the damage if traversal occurs.
  • Consider separating writable upload areas from application code and sensitive configuration to reduce the impact of arbitrary writes.

How teams detect issues like this

Detection usually involves a combination of code-centric and behavior-centric approaches:

  • Static analysis: Configure rules or queries that flag direct concatenation of user-controlled input into filesystem paths, or any use of open, os.path.join, or similar APIs where tainted parameters are involved without subsequent path validation.
  • Code review: Look for file upload or save utilities that accept filename or destination parameters, checking whether:
  • Paths are normalized and validated against a base directory.
  • Absolute paths and traversal sequences are explicitly disallowed.
  • Dynamic testing: Use security tests or fuzzing of file-related endpoints with traversal patterns (e.g., ../, nested traversals, or platform-specific sequences) to see if files outside the intended upload directory can be created or read.
  • Runtime monitoring: Monitor server logs and file system activity for anomalous file access patterns, such as writes to configuration directories or unexpected paths relative to the service's normal workload.

Sources

SourceLink
github.comgithub.com/ef10007/MLOps_MCP/
github.comgithub.com/ef10007/MLOps_MCP/issues/1
vuldb.comvuldb.com/submit/802085
vuldb.comvuldb.com/vuln/359809
vuldb.comvuldb.com/vuln/359809/cti

Frequently asked

questions

Exploitability depends on how widely the save_file tool is exposed. If it is reachable over a network API or through an agent accessible by untrusted users, remote exploitation is feasible. In more restricted environments, the risk is constrained to those who can trigger the file-saving functionality.

Not inherently. If the endpoint or tool that wraps save_file is publicly accessible without authentication, anonymous attackers may exploit it. If deployments protect that interface behind authentication or network controls, then attackers would need the level of access required to invoke the tool.

The safest pattern is to enforce a strict upload directory and validate all user-provided path input against it. Normalize the computed path, confirm it remains under the designated directory, and reject any request that attempts to escape that boundary. Additionally, ensure the service runs with minimal filesystem privileges.

Treat all path components derived from user input as untrusted. Establish a standard utility for secure path handling (normalization plus base directory enforcement) and require its use wherever files are created or written. Combine this with secure defaults (separate writable data from code, least-privilege service accounts) and automated checks in code review or CI to detect unsafe path construction patterns early.

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