Summary
A path traversal vulnerability in the notes-mcp project allows an attacker to manipulate the root_dir/path argument in notes_mcp.py to access files outside the intended directory.
When exposed remotely, this flaw may enable attackers to read or potentially overwrite arbitrary files on the server, depending on how the function is used and underlying file permissions.
Affected context
The vulnerability occurs in the notes_mcp.py component of notes-mcp versions up to 0.1.4, where a function accepts a root_dir or path parameter to locate files or directories.
It is relevant in deployments where:
- User-controlled input can influence the
root_dir/pathargument - The application performs file operations (read/write/list) based on this argument
- There is no robust normalization or restriction to a fixed base directory
In such contexts, specially crafted paths may escape the expected notes directory and interact with arbitrary locations on the server's file system.
Exploit preconditions
- Attack surface: Remote, via any API endpoint, web handler, or service boundary that passes user input into
root_dir/pathused bynotes_mcp.py - Required access: Ability to send crafted requests or commands to the notes-mcp service (e.g., authenticated or unauthenticated HTTP client, plugin user, or automation)
- Trigger point: Invocation of the vulnerable function in
notes_mcp.pythat performs file system operations based on the supplied path - Why exploitation is possible: The implementation appears to trust the
root_dir/pathinput without constraining it to a safe base directory or rejecting traversal tokens like../, allowing escape from the intended directory structure
Why this happens
This issue stems from insufficient validation and normalization of file system paths derived from user input.
Instead of enforcing that all file operations stay within a defined root (e.g., a notes directory), the code likely concatenates or otherwise uses the provided root_dir/path argument directly.
This aligns with CWE-22: Improper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory, where an attacker uses traversal sequences or absolute paths to access files outside the permitted area.
The underlying bug class is an insecure pattern of trusting externally supplied paths without canonicalizing them and checking that they reside within a predetermined, restricted directory.
Potential impact
- Access to sensitive files that the application process can read, such as configuration files or logs
- Disclosure of credentials, API keys, or secrets stored on the filesystem
- Overwriting or corrupting files if write operations are exposed through the same path mechanism
- Leveraging file reads to gather information that facilitates further attacks against the host or environment
- Potential pivot to other applications or services that share the same file system or credentials
General mitigation guidance
Effective mitigation focuses on constraining file access to a well-defined and enforced root directory and treating all path input as untrusted.
Common defensive patterns include:
- Canonicalizing input paths (e.g., resolving
.and..) and verifying that the resulting absolute path is a descendant of an expected base directory - Rejecting or sanitizing path segments that contain traversal tokens such as
.., absolute path prefixes, or drive specifiers - Using high-level helper functions or libraries that operate relative to a configured root and prevent escape
- Separating untrusted data (e.g., note IDs) from file system paths by using opaque identifiers rather than direct filenames
- Applying least-privilege to the running process so that even if traversal is attempted, accessible files are limited
How teams detect issues like this
Organizations can detect this class of vulnerability through:
- Static analysis rules that flag direct use of user-controlled values in file system APIs (
open,os.path.join,Path(...), etc.) without validation - Code review checklists that explicitly require verification of path canonicalization and base-directory enforcement for any file access
- Unit and integration tests that intentionally send traversal payloads (e.g.,
../../etc/passwd) and assert that access is denied or normalized correctly - Security scanning or dynamic testing tools configured with path traversal test cases against endpoints that appear to handle file names or directories

