Summary
Cypht contains a PHP object injection vulnerability in its logout handler, where attacker-controlled data from the back_query parameter is decoded and passed to PHP's unserialize() function without adequate restrictions.
An authenticated attacker who can reach the affected handler may provide a crafted serialized object graph, potentially triggering gadget-chain execution and arbitrary operating system commands as the web server process.
Affected context
The vulnerability occurs in Cypht deployments that expose the affected logout handler and process the back_query GET parameter through PHP deserialization. Risk is greatest when an authenticated user can submit request parameters to this endpoint and the application contains usable gadget chains in its runtime code or dependencies.
Exploit preconditions
- Attack surface: The Cypht logout handler and its
back_queryGET parameter - Required access: Valid authentication sufficient to reach the affected handler
- Trigger point: Processing the parameter during logout request handling
- Why exploitation is possible: Attacker-controlled serialized data is decoded and passed to
unserialize()without an allow-list, integrity check, or restrictive type policy
Why this happens
The underlying bug is unsafe deserialization of attacker-influenced data. PHP's unserialize() can reconstruct object instances and invoke serialization-related behavior, allowing unexpected object graphs to interact with application or dependency methods.
This maps to CWE-502: Deserialization of Untrusted Data, because data received through an HTTP request is treated as a trusted serialized object representation rather than as constrained, validated application state.
Potential impact
- An attacker may execute arbitrary operating system commands
- The web server process could be compromised
- Application data and credentials may be exposed or altered
- The attacker could establish persistence within the application environment
- Additional internal systems may be reached if the process has excessive privileges
General mitigation guidance
Mitigation generally focuses on removing unsafe deserialization from request-processing paths and reducing the trust placed in client-controlled state.
Common defensive patterns include:
- Replacing native object deserialization with narrowly defined scalar or structured-data formats
- Using explicit schemas and strict type validation for redirect or navigation state
- Applying integrity protection to state that must cross a trust boundary, with server-side verification before use
- Enforcing authentication and authorization checks at the handler boundary
- Restricting deserialization to documented classes through narrowly scoped policies where legacy compatibility is unavoidable
- Running the web process with least privilege and limiting access to sensitive operating-system resources
- Keeping dependencies and application components limited to the functionality required at runtime
How teams detect issues like this
Detection programs commonly look for:
- Static-analysis findings involving
unserialize()or equivalent deserialization APIs on request-derived data - Data-flow paths from GET, POST, cookie, or header inputs into object reconstruction functions
- Code-review signals such as base64 decoding followed by deserialization without integrity verification
- Missing class allow-lists, schema checks, or explicit type restrictions around serialized state
- Web application logs showing unusual requests to logout handlers or repeated malformed
back_queryvalues - Policy enforcement that blocks unsafe deserialization APIs in web-facing request paths
Automated security review tools can help identify dangerous source-to-sink data flows, but findings should be validated against authentication boundaries and available runtime gadget chains.

