Severity:

HIGH RISK

(7.3)

SSRF in ChatGPTNextWeb NextChat proxyHandler

CVE-2026-7177

Analyzed

Vulnerability type

Category:

Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF)

CWE:

CWE-918

Impact:

Network pivoting via SSRF, potential access to internal services and sensitive metadata

Severity:

HIGH RISK

(7.3)

CVSS version:

3.1

Catch this CVE while code is being written

Detect vulnerable code directly in pull requests, so CVEs are fixed before merge.

Summary

A server-side request forgery (SSRF) vulnerability in ChatGPTNextWeb NextChat up to version 2.16.1 allows attackers to abuse the proxyHandler endpoint in app/api/[provider]/[...path]/route.ts to make arbitrary outbound requests from the server.

When reachable over the network, this flaw can be used to target internal services, cloud metadata endpoints, or other protected resources that are not directly exposed to the attacker.

Affected context

This vulnerability occurs in deployments of ChatGPTNextWeb NextChat (≤ 2.16.1) where:

  • The API routes under app/api/[provider]/[...path]/route.ts are exposed to untrusted clients (e.g., Internet or multi-tenant environments).
  • The proxyHandler function makes outbound HTTP(S) requests on behalf of the client.
  • Request target hosts, URLs, or paths are influenced by user-controlled or partially user-controlled input.

In such setups, the application's server network position (e.g., inside a VPC or behind a firewall) becomes an attack proxy for external users.

Exploit preconditions

  • Attack surface: Public or semi-public HTTP(S) API endpoints implementing proxyHandler in app/api/[provider]/[...path]/route.ts.
  • Required access: Ability to send crafted HTTP requests to the affected API route; no special privileges are inherently required beyond this access.
  • Trigger point: Invocation of the proxyHandler logic that constructs an outbound request based on client-supplied parameters (such as URL, host, path, or query).
  • Why exploitation is possible: The server trusts and forwards user-influenced network targets without robust validation, allowing an attacker to redirect the server's outbound traffic to arbitrary internal or external destinations.

Why this happens

The core issue stems from insufficient validation of user-controlled request parameters used to build outbound HTTP(S) calls in the proxyHandler function.

Instead of restricting the destination to a tightly controlled allowlist or normalizing and enforcing safe URL patterns, the implementation appears to accept client-provided targets and forward them directly.

This maps to CWE-918: Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF), where the application exposes its own network reachability and trust relationships by allowing untrusted input to dictate server-initiated requests.

Potential impact

  • Access to internal HTTP(S) services that are not exposed to the public Internet.
  • Interaction with cloud provider metadata endpoints, which may leak credentials, tokens, or configuration data.
  • Discovery and enumeration of internal network structure, including open ports and service behaviors.
  • Potential bypass of IP-based access controls and firewalls by originating traffic from the trusted application server.
  • Use of the application server as a pivot point for further attacks within the hosting environment.

General mitigation guidance

Effective mitigation typically focuses on constraining where the server can connect and reducing trust in user-controlled URLs:

  • Introduce strict allowlists of permitted upstream hosts or base URLs for proxyHandler, and reject any request that does not match known-safe destinations.
  • Normalize and validate user input before constructing outbound requests, blocking IP literals, localhost ranges, private/reserved networks, and URL schemes that are not explicitly required.
  • Separate proxy functionality for untrusted users from privileged backend integrations, and ensure they do not share the same broad network permissions.
  • Apply least-privilege network policies at the infrastructure level (e.g., security groups, firewall rules, service meshes) to limit the server's ability to reach sensitive internal or metadata endpoints.
  • Prefer higher-level APIs or internal service abstractions instead of generic "open URL" proxy endpoints when designing integrations.

How teams detect issues like this

Detection can focus on both code and runtime behavior:

  • Static analysis / code review:
  • Flag any code that constructs outbound requests using user-controlled URL, host, or path parameters without allowlist checks.
  • Look for generic proxy-style endpoints that forward arbitrary paths or query parameters to upstream services.
  • Verify that private/loopback IP ranges and metadata endpoints are explicitly blocked.
  • Runtime monitoring / logging:
  • Centralize logs of outbound HTTP(S) requests from the application server, and monitor for connections to internal IP ranges, loopback addresses, or cloud metadata IPs.
  • Add alerts for unusual spikes in outbound connections or requests to unexpected destinations.
  • Policy enforcement:
  • Use infrastructure policies (e.g., egress filtering, service mesh policies) to restrict which hosts the application can reach.
  • Incorporate SSRF-focused checks into automated code review tools and CI pipelines for API routes that perform outbound calls.

Sources

SourceLink
gist.github.comgist.github.com/YLChen-007/da6b00024f5b7e1d4fa0658c19b77fbf
github.comgithub.com/ChatGPTNextWeb/NextChat/
github.comgithub.com/ChatGPTNextWeb/NextChat/issues/6742
vuldb.comvuldb.com/submit/797645
vuldb.comvuldb.com/vuln/359779
vuldb.comvuldb.com/vuln/359779/cti

Frequently asked

questions

Yes. If the affected NextChat API routes are accessible over the network to untrusted clients, an attacker can exploit the SSRF remotely by sending crafted requests to the proxyHandler endpoint.

The attacker typically only needs the ability to make HTTP(S) requests to the exposed API endpoint; no local access or special privileges are inherently required.

The most robust pattern is to restrict proxyHandler to a well-defined allowlist of upstream hosts or base URLs, validate and normalize all user input influencing outbound requests, and refuse any destination that falls outside the approved set or into internal/loopback address ranges.

Avoid exposing generic proxy endpoints that forward arbitrary URLs, treat any user-influenced network target as untrusted, enforce network-level egress controls, and include SSRF-specific checks in code review and security testing for any functionality that performs outbound HTTP(s) requests.

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