Summary
A high-severity code injection vulnerability in GPAC affects DVB Multi-Protocol Encapsulation parsing components, including descriptorTime_slice_fec_identifier() and gf_m2ts_ipdatagram_reader(). If a vulnerable application processes attacker-controlled media or transport-stream data, crafted input may cause arbitrary code execution.
Affected context
The issue occurs in GPAC builds containing the affected DVB MPE parsing logic. Risk is higher when an application accepts, downloads, or automatically processes untrusted MPEG transport streams or related media data, particularly in services that perform parsing with elevated privileges or without isolation.
Exploit preconditions
- Attack surface: GPAC DVB MPE and MPEG transport-stream parsing
- Required access: Ability to provide or influence media or transport-stream data processed by GPAC
- Trigger point: Parsing through
descriptorTime_slice_fec_identifier()orgf_m2ts_ipdatagram_reader() - Why exploitation is possible: Crafted parser input may reach an unsafe code path that permits attacker-controlled behavior to be interpreted or executed
Why this happens
The underlying defect is an insufficiently safe handling of attacker-influenced data within DVB MPE parsing logic. A parsing condition in the affected components can allow input to influence executable behavior rather than remaining limited to validated data processing, mapping to CWE-94: Improper Control of Generation of Code.
Potential impact
- An attacker may execute arbitrary code in the GPAC process context.
- A compromised process could expose or modify accessible application data.
- The vulnerability could enable denial of service or service disruption.
- Code execution could facilitate lateral movement when the process has excessive permissions or network access.
General mitigation guidance
Mitigation generally focuses on ensuring that untrusted media data cannot influence executable behavior and that parsing occurs within tightly constrained boundaries.
Common defensive patterns include:
- Applying the vendor-provided security correction through normal dependency management processes.
- Validating parser inputs against strict structural and size expectations before deeper processing.
- Rejecting malformed, ambiguous, or unexpected DVB MPE descriptors and transport-stream fields.
- Running media parsers with least privilege and appropriate process or container isolation.
- Limiting parser access to sensitive files, credentials, devices, and network resources.
- Avoiding automatic processing of untrusted media where business requirements do not require it.
How teams detect issues like this
Organizations can look for:
- Static analysis findings involving unchecked lengths, offsets, type assumptions, or control-flow decisions derived from parsed media fields.
- Code review signals where parser data reaches callbacks, dynamic dispatch, memory operations, or other execution-sensitive behavior without strict validation.
- Fuzzing coverage for DVB MPE descriptors, time-slice FEC identifiers, and malformed MPEG transport-stream inputs.
- Runtime monitoring for unexpected child processes, crashes, abnormal resource use, or outbound connections from GPAC-based services.
- Policy enforcement requiring sandboxing and least-privilege execution for media-processing components.
Automated code review and fuzz-testing tools may help identify similar parser weaknesses earlier.

