Severity:

CRITICAL RISK

(9.8)

OS Command Injection in Totolink A8000RU CGI Login Password

CVE-2026-7155

Deferred

Vulnerability type

Category:

OS Command Injection

CWE:

CWE-77, CWE-78

Impact:

Remote Code Execution and Device Takeover

Severity:

CRITICAL RISK

(9.8)

CVSS version:

3.1

Catch this CVE while code is being written

Detect vulnerable code directly in pull requests, so CVEs are fixed before merge.

Summary

Totolink A8000RU firmware 7.1cu.643_b20200521 contains an OS command injection vulnerability in the setLoginPasswordCfg handler of /cgi-bin/cstecgi.cgi, where the admpass parameter is unsafely processed.

A remote attacker can inject arbitrary shell commands through this parameter, potentially achieving full takeover of the affected router when the vulnerable CGI endpoint is exposed.

Affected context

The issue occurs in the web-based management interface of the Totolink A8000RU router, specifically in the CGI handler responsible for setting the administrator login password.

When the router's HTTP management service is reachable (e.g., from the local network or, if misconfigured, from the internet), the setLoginPasswordCfg function processes the admpass argument in a way that allows command injection.

The vulnerability is present when user-controlled input is incorporated into OS-level command execution without strict validation, encoding, or safe APIs.

Exploit preconditions

  • Attack surface: HTTP(S) interface exposing /cgi-bin/cstecgi.cgi on the Totolink A8000RU.
  • Required access: Network-level access to the router's management port (typically within the LAN; may be remote if WAN access is enabled or exposed).
  • Trigger point: An HTTP request invoking the setLoginPasswordCfg action with a crafted admpass parameter.
  • Why exploitation is possible: The admpass parameter is incorporated into a shell or OS command without proper sanitization, quoting, or use of safe command-execution primitives, enabling injection of additional commands.

Why this happens

This vulnerability stems from constructing OS command lines using untrusted input and passing them to a shell interpreter.

The setLoginPasswordCfg logic appears to embed the admpass parameter directly into a command string or a shell context, allowing metacharacters (such as command separators or subshell syntax) to alter the intended command.

This aligns with CWE-78: Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an OS Command ('OS Command Injection') and is related to CWE-77: Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in a Command ('Command Injection'), where user input is not adequately constrained before being evaluated by the operating system.

Potential impact

  • Execution of arbitrary OS commands with the privileges of the router's web/CGI process.
  • Complete compromise of the router, including changing configuration, DNS settings, and routing behavior.
  • Installation of persistent malware or inclusion of the device in a botnet.
  • Interception, redirection, or manipulation of user traffic traversing the router.
  • Use of the compromised router as a pivot point for attacks against internal network devices.

General mitigation guidance

Mitigation focuses on eliminating direct interpretation of user input by the shell and constraining how configuration values reach OS-level operations.

Recommended design and coding patterns include:

  • Using high-level, parameterized APIs for system actions (e.g., direct configuration file updates or dedicated system libraries) instead of shell commands.
  • Avoiding functions that execute shell-constructed strings; prefer APIs that pass arguments as distinct parameters without shell parsing.
  • Strictly validating and normalizing password and configuration fields to allow only expected character sets and lengths.
  • Applying output encoding or safe quoting for any user-derived data that must interact with system utilities.
  • Running web and CGI components with least-privilege accounts and minimizing their ability to invoke system commands.
  • Designing the management interface so that sensitive operations do not rely on shell wrappers but on internal logic.

How teams detect issues like this

Detection is typically achieved by combining code-centric review with behavioral monitoring:

  • Static analysis and code review:
  • Search for uses of command execution APIs (e.g., system, popen, exec*, shell_exec) that concatenate or interpolate HTTP parameters such as admpass.
  • Flag any string building that mixes request parameters with shell metacharacters or command fragments.
  • Review CGI handlers and router management scripts for patterns where configuration input is passed directly to the shell.
  • Security testing:
  • Perform black-box testing of CGI endpoints with fuzzed or crafted input containing command separators to check for anomalous behavior.
  • Use dynamic application security testing tools configured to probe for command injection signatures.
  • Operational monitoring:
  • Monitor system logs for unexpected command executions initiated by the web/CGI processes.
  • Track abnormal outbound connections or traffic patterns originating from router management components.

Sources

SourceLink
github.comgithub.com/Litengzheng/vuldb_new2/blob/main/A8000RU/vul_319/README.md
vuldb.comvuldb.com/submit/801141
vuldb.comvuldb.com/vuln/359754
vuldb.comvuldb.com/vuln/359754/cti
totolink.nettotolink.net/

Frequently asked

questions

It can be, but it depends on how the router is deployed. If the management interface or /cgi-bin/cstecgi.cgi is exposed on the WAN or otherwise reachable from the internet, a remote attacker may exploit it. If management is restricted to the local network, exploitation is generally limited to attackers with LAN access.

Public disclosures suggest that exploitation targets a CGI handler parameter directly. Whether authentication is required depends on the router's access control configuration and how the handler is wired into the authentication flow. In many embedded web interfaces, logic flaws or misconfigurations can make such handlers reachable without proper authentication.

Replace shell-based implementations with internal APIs that perform configuration changes directly, and ensure that no user input is ever interpreted by a shell. Where interaction with system utilities is unavoidable, use parameterized, non-shell execution primitives and enforce strict input validation and encoding.

Adopt a secure-by-design approach: minimize use of shell commands, enforce least privilege, define strict schemas and character policies for all configuration inputs, and integrate automated security checks in the development pipeline to flag any new uses of unsafe command execution patterns.

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