Summary
Dolibarr's Members REST API may allow users who can create members to reset the password of any user account, including the system administrator, without having password-change permission.
By supplying another account's identifier and a new password, an attacker could take over the account or lock out its legitimate owner when the affected API behavior is reachable.
Affected context
The vulnerability occurs in Dolibarr deployments where the Members REST API is enabled and a user has permission to create members. The API may accept an arbitrary target account identifier and process a password change without separately checking whether the caller is authorized to modify that account's credentials. Risk depends on API exposure, role configuration, and whether the relevant member-creation capability is granted to untrusted or low-privilege users.
Exploit preconditions
- Attack surface: Members REST API password or user-management request handling
- Required access: An authenticated account with member-creation rights
- Trigger point: A request containing a selected user account identifier and a replacement password
- Why exploitation is possible: Authorization for member creation is not adequately separated from authorization to change another user's password
Why this happens
The underlying bug is an authorization failure in which the API validates a caller's ability to create members but does not enforce a distinct permission check for changing the credentials of the selected account. This maps primarily to CWE-862: Missing Authorization. The acceptance of caller-controlled account fields without restricting which records may be modified also relates to CWE-915: Improperly Controlled Modification of Dynamically-Managed Object Attributes.
Potential impact
- An attacker may reset the password of another user account.
- A legitimate user could be locked out of their account.
- An attacker could take over an administrator account.
- Unauthorized access to protected business data and administrative functions could follow.
- Compromised accounts could be used for persistence or further privilege escalation.
General mitigation guidance
Mitigation typically focuses on enforcing authorization at the specific action and object level rather than relying on a broad role capability.
Common defensive patterns include:
- Require an explicit password-management permission for credential changes.
- Verify that the caller may modify the selected account, especially privileged accounts.
- Apply server-side allowlists for mutable fields and avoid trusting client-supplied authorization-related attributes.
- Use secure-by-default role definitions that do not combine member creation with account administration.
- Require stronger controls for administrator credential changes, such as reauthentication or an approved administrative workflow.
- Limit API exposure and follow least-privilege principles for service and user accounts.
How teams detect issues like this
Organizations can identify similar issues through:
- Static analysis and authorization-focused testing of REST endpoints.
- Code review checks confirming that every sensitive action has an action-specific and object-specific permission check.
- Tests that attempt to modify another user's credentials using only lower-privilege permissions.
- Monitoring for password-reset requests targeting privileged accounts or unusual numbers of unrelated users.
- API policy enforcement that restricts credential-management operations to approved roles and workflows.
Automated security review tools may help flag direct use of caller-controlled identifiers in sensitive update operations, but findings should be validated against the application's authorization model.

