/

CVE-2026-71424

Severity:

CRITICAL RISK

(9.6)

Broken Access Control (CWE-863) in Onyx MCP API Endpoints

CVE-2026-71424

Deferred

Vulnerability type

Category:

Broken Access Control

CWE:

CWE-200, CWE-863

Impact:

Cross-user OAuth credential disclosure

Severity:

CRITICAL RISK

(9.6)

CVSS version:

3.1

Catch this CVE while code is being written

Detect vulnerable code directly in pull requests, so CVEs are fixed before merge.

Summary

Onyx exposes OAuth Authorization headers belonging to other users through MCP server API responses. An attacker with BASIC_ACCESS may retrieve another user's token when shared MCP configuration data contains per-user credentials.

Affected context

The issue occurs in Onyx deployments where MCP server API endpoints expose authentication metadata derived from shared MCP connection configuration. Per-user OAuth tokens and client information may be copied into an administrator-scoped configuration record, after which the API can return those values to users with BASIC_ACCESS. Exposure depends on the affected MCP configuration flow and the presence of stored OAuth credentials.

Exploit preconditions

  • Attack surface: Onyx MCP server API endpoints
  • Required access: An authenticated account with BASIC_ACCESS
  • Trigger point: Retrieving MCP server data or persona-associated server data
  • Required condition: Another user's OAuth token or related client information

must have been copied into a shared MCP connection configuration record

  • Why exploitation is possible: Authorization data from a shared record is

returned without adequately enforcing ownership or tenant-level access checks

Why this happens

The underlying flaw combines insecure data scoping with insufficient authorization enforcement. Per-user OAuth values are written into a shared administrator MCPConnectionConfig row, and response serialization exposes the row's authentication headers to callers who are not entitled to view them. This maps primarily to CWE-863, Incorrect Authorization, because access is not properly restricted to the owning user or permitted security context. It also maps to CWE-200, Exposure of Sensitive Information, because OAuth Authorization headers are returned in an API response.

Potential impact

  • An attacker may obtain another user's OAuth access token
  • A stolen token could allow unauthorized access to connected services
  • Attackers could impersonate users within the token's permitted scope
  • Sensitive data may be disclosed or modified through downstream integrations
  • The incident could enable broader account, tenant, or workflow compromise

General mitigation guidance

Mitigation generally focuses on enforcing strict ownership boundaries for

credentials and preventing sensitive authentication data from entering

shared response objects.

Common defensive patterns include:

  • Store OAuth tokens in user- or tenant-scoped secret records rather than shared

administrator configuration rows

  • Apply explicit authorization checks before reading or serializing MCP server

configuration

  • Return only the minimum non-sensitive fields needed by the client
  • Exclude Authorization headers and raw tokens from ordinary API responses
  • Use secure secret references or server-side token handles instead of exposing

credential material

  • Apply least privilege and narrow scopes to OAuth integrations
  • Invalidate or rotate credentials that may have been exposed

How teams detect issues like this

Organizations can look for this class of issue through:

  • Static analysis and code review rules that flag shared persistence of

user-scoped secrets

  • Review of API serializers for authentication headers, tokens, and client

secrets

  • Authorization tests that compare access across users, tenants, and privilege

levels

  • Dynamic testing using separate accounts to verify that one user's MCP

metadata cannot appear in another user's response

  • API gateway or policy controls that block sensitive headers and credential

fields from external responses

  • Audit logging and alerting for unusual retrieval of MCP configuration data

Automated review tools may help identify direct token exposure, missing

ownership checks, and insecure object-to-response mappings.

Sources

SourceLink
github.comgithub.com/onyx-dot-app/onyx/commit/3f3d79d1a7722fdc84a1c61c8aa830d890017e9e
github.comgithub.com/onyx-dot-app/onyx/commit/4001cedd0a8968723bfe95dd188914ed56777910
github.comgithub.com/onyx-dot-app/onyx/commit/b103937888fd5008067c2bb6eb6e5424576394f2
github.comgithub.com/onyx-dot-app/onyx/pull/11238
github.comgithub.com/onyx-dot-app/onyx/pull/11242
github.comgithub.com/onyx-dot-app/onyx/pull/11243
github.comgithub.com/onyx-dot-app/onyx/releases/tag/v4.0.0
github.comgithub.com/onyx-dot-app/onyx/security/advisories/GHSA-q62f-rv3h-f822

Frequently asked

questions

Yes. It may be remotely exploitable through the affected MCP API endpoints when

an attacker has a valid account with BASIC_ACCESS and the deployment contains

exposed per-user OAuth data.

Not necessarily. The described exposure allows a BASIC_ACCESS user to receive

data from a shared administrator-scoped configuration record when authorization

boundaries are not correctly enforced.

Keep OAuth credentials in strictly user- or tenant-scoped secret storage,

enforce ownership checks at every read path, and never serialize raw

Authorization headers into general-purpose API responses.

Use least-privilege OAuth scopes, conduct cross-user authorization testing,

apply response allowlists that exclude secrets, and monitor for unexpected

access to credential-bearing configuration records.

Find out what's already
exploitable in your codebase.