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CVE-2026-71404

Severity:

HIGH RISK

(8.7)

Authorization Bypass (CWE-639) in Rancher RBAC Controller

CVE-2026-71404

Analyzed

Vulnerability type

Category:

Authorization Bypass Through User-Controlled Key

CWE:

CWE-639

Impact:

Unauthorized RBAC Modification and Authorization Denial of Service

Severity:

HIGH RISK

(8.7)

CVSS version:

3.1

Catch this CVE while code is being written

Detect vulnerable code directly in pull requests, so CVEs are fixed before merge.

Summary

Rancher Manager's GlobalRole controller can use a user-controlled annotation to select an existing Kubernetes ClusterRole and overwrite its permission rules without confirming ownership. A user permitted to create or update delegated GlobalRoles may therefore disrupt authorization for principals bound to roles such as cluster-admin, with the effect persisting after the malicious GlobalRole is removed.

Affected context

The issue occurs in Rancher Manager deployments where the GlobalRole controller processes the authz.management.cattle.io/cr-name annotation and where a user has delegated permission to create or update GlobalRoles. Risk is present when the controller accepts a referenced ClusterRole without verifying that the GlobalRole owns or is authorized to manage it. The reported affected range is Rancher Manager versions before 2.15.1.

Exploit preconditions

  • Attack surface: Rancher GlobalRole management and the controller's ClusterRole reconciliation path
  • Required access: Permission to create or update a delegated GlobalRole
  • Trigger point: GlobalRole reconciliation after processing the user-settable authz.management.cattle.io/cr-name annotation
  • Why exploitation is possible: The controller derives a target ClusterRole name from attacker-influenced input and overwrites its rules without an effective ownership or authorization check

Why this happens

The underlying bug is authorization through a user-controlled object reference. The controller treats the annotation value as sufficient authority to select a ClusterRole, rather than independently verifying that the referenced object is within the GlobalRole's permitted management scope. This behavior maps to CWE-639: Authorization Bypass Through User-Controlled Key, because attacker-influenced naming determines which security-sensitive object is modified.

Potential impact

  • An attacker may revoke or alter permissions for principals bound to the targeted ClusterRole.
  • The change could disrupt administrative and workload operations across affected clusters.
  • Authorization failures may persist after the malicious GlobalRole is deleted.
  • Recovery could require restoration of trusted RBAC rules and review of related access assignments.

General mitigation guidance

Mitigation generally focuses on enforcing ownership-aware authorization before any RBAC object is selected or modified.

Defensive patterns include:

  • Treating annotation values and object names as untrusted references rather than authorization decisions.
  • Verifying controller ownership, namespace or scope boundaries, and permitted object relationships before applying changes.
  • Allowing reconciliation to modify only explicitly managed ClusterRoles, preferably identified through controller-owned metadata rather than user-selected names.
  • Applying least privilege to delegated GlobalRole management and separating role delegation from cluster-wide RBAC administration.
  • Preserving trusted RBAC state and using controlled, auditable recovery workflows for security-sensitive permission changes.
  • Enforcing admission and policy controls that restrict unauthorized ClusterRole mutations.

How teams detect issues like this

Detection can combine controller-focused code review, runtime audit analysis, and policy enforcement.

  • Static analysis can flag security-sensitive object lookups whose names originate from annotations, labels, request fields, or other user-controlled keys.
  • Code review should examine whether ownership, scope, and authorization are independently validated before RBAC objects are updated.
  • Kubernetes audit logs can be monitored for unexpected ClusterRole rule modifications, especially changes initiated through GlobalRole reconciliation.
  • Policy controls can alert on or deny ClusterRole updates by identities that are not approved RBAC administrators or owning controllers.
  • Automated security review tools may help identify user-controlled references used in privileged object mutation paths.

Sources

SourceLink
github.comgithub.com/rancher/rancher/pull/56593
github.comgithub.com/rancher/rancher/pull/56642

Frequently asked

questions

No. Exploitation generally requires delegated permission to create or update GlobalRoles, along with a deployment in which the vulnerable reconciliation behavior is available.

A permitted attacker may cause an existing ClusterRole's rules to be overwritten, potentially removing access from every principal bound to that role. The resulting authorization disruption may remain after the malicious GlobalRole is deleted.

Ensure that user-controlled annotations cannot select arbitrary security-sensitive objects. Controllers should verify ownership, scope, and authorization before modifying any ClusterRole.

Apply least privilege to delegated RBAC administration, enforce admission policies for privileged role changes, review controller object-reference logic, and monitor audit logs for unexpected ClusterRole mutations.

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