Summary
Magistrala's message-readers API accepts a format value from an HTTP query string and inserts it into PostgreSQL or TimescaleDB SQL statements without validation. An authenticated user who can query channel messages may be able to alter the intended query, potentially exposing, modifying, or disrupting database content.
Affected context
The issue occurs in deployments using Magistrala's message-readers API with
the PostgreSQL or TimescaleDB reader. It becomes risky when an authenticated
caller can submit message-query parameters and the resulting format value
reaches SQL construction without being restricted to an approved set of
identifiers or otherwise safely separated from the query structure.
Exploit preconditions
- Attack surface: HTTP message-readers API
- Required access: Authentication and permission to query channel messages
- Trigger point: A request that supplies the
formatquery parameter - Backend condition: PostgreSQL or TimescaleDB reader code constructs a
query using the supplied value
- Why exploitation is possible: The value is interpolated into raw SQL
through string formatting rather than being validated against allowed
identifiers or safely parameterized
Why this happens
The underlying bug is SQL injection caused by mixing untrusted request data
with SQL syntax. The readers use string formatting to place the format
value, and related query data, directly into a database statement. Because
the input is not constrained to an approved identifier set before query
construction, a caller may influence the structure of the generated SQL.
This behavior maps to CWE-89: Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an SQL Command.
Potential impact
- An attacker may read data outside the intended message scope.
- An attacker could alter or delete database records if the database account
permits those operations.
- Crafted queries may cause database errors or service disruption.
- Sensitive metadata or message contents could be exposed.
- The database account or connected services may be exposed to follow-on
compromise.
General mitigation guidance
Mitigation generally focuses on keeping request data separate from SQL
structure and reducing database privileges.
Common defensive patterns include:
- Restricting format values to a small, explicit allowlist of supported
identifiers or mapping external values to internal constants.
- Using parameterized queries for all values that can be represented as
parameters.
- Avoiding direct interpolation of request-controlled identifiers into SQL.
- Applying strict input validation before query construction and preserving
validation across all reader implementations.
- Running the service with a database role limited to the required
read/write operations and schemas.
- Separating application data from administrative or sensitive database
objects.
How teams detect issues like this
Detection can include static analysis and code review searches for SQL
statements built with fmt.Sprintf, string concatenation, or interpolation
involving HTTP query parameters. Reviewers can trace values such as
format from request parsing through database calls and verify that dynamic
identifiers are allowlisted. Runtime monitoring may flag anomalous query
errors, unexpected schema access, or unusual query patterns. CI policies and
automated review tools can enforce parameterized-query usage and prohibit
unvalidated request data in SQL construction.
